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ABSTRACT 
Firms that announce open-market share repurchase programs are not obligated to 
follow through in the actual acquisition of shares.  In fact, we find that the majority of 
firms fail to acquire the target number of shares specified at announcement and many 
firms fail to repurchase any shares at all.  Therefore, the announcement of a share 
repurchase program has a degree of uncertainty regarding the announcing firm’s 
credibility. This study examines the possibility that market participants evaluate the 
credibility of a firm’s share repurchase announcement based on the firm’s previous share 
repurchase history.  We examine 1,507 share repurchase programs for firms listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) from 1995 to 2005 and find that firms that have 
completed a higher proportion of previous share repurchase programs experience larger 
abnormal returns on the announcement of subsequent repurchase programs.  Therefore, 
we conclude that the market reacts more favorably to the share repurchase 
announcements of credible firms compared to firms that lack credibility.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, dividends have been the primary method of returning wealth to 
shareholders.  Over the last 20 years, a drastic change in the payout policy regime has 
occurred and share repurchases have emerged as the dominant method of distributing 
corporate cash flows in North America.  In 1980, U.S. corporations repurchased 
approximately $6.6 billion of shares accounting for 4.8 percent of total earnings (Grullon 
and Michaely, 2002).  In 1999, share repurchases increased to $202.8 billion and 
accounted for 41.8 percent of earnings, compared to $197.8 billion paid out as dividends 
that year.  This marked the first time in history that share repurchases overtook dividends 
as the preferred choice of corporate payout.  Recent data verifies that the trend of 
increasing share repurchases continues; in 2005, constituent companies of the S&P 500 
repurchased $349 billion of shares, compared to $202 billion paid out as dividends.1   
In Canada, the statistics on payout policy are very similar to those of the U.S.   
Figure 1-1 illustrates the aggregate cash payouts of Canadian firms listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX).  In 2000, open-market share repurchases surpassed dividends as 
the primary means of distributing cash-flow to investors.  Another noteworthy 
observation is that share repurchases seem to be cyclical and are much more volatile than 
                                                 
 
1 According to data released by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) in a press release dated June 
12, 2006. 
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dividend payments.  In 2001, share repurchases declined relative to dividends, only to 
surpass dividend payments again in 2004.  This suggests that the increase in open-market 
share repurchases is not a temporary trend. 
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Figure 1-1.  Aggregate cash distributions to shareholders in Canada 
This figure plots annual aggregate cash distributions for Canadian corporations listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX).  For dividends, the sample includes all cash dividend observations (regular and special) 
on the CFMRC database (Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre).  For repurchases, the sample 
includes all open-market share repurchases reported to the TSX.  The estimate of the dollar amount of 
repurchases is calculated using the closing share price at the end of the month prior to the announcement of 
the repurchase program multiplied by the number of shares actually repurchased in the 12 months 
subsequent to the repurchase announcement. 
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Extant literature overwhelmingly finds a positive price reaction for firms around 
the announcement of a share repurchase program.2  However, firms that announce open-
market share repurchase programs are not obligated to follow through in the actual 
acquisition of shares.  In reality, the majority of firms fail to acquire the number of shares 
specified in the share repurchase announcement and many firms fail to repurchase any 
shares at all.   
Figure 1-2 provides the share repurchase history for three companies listed on the 
TSX.  The figure illustrates the differences in the completion consistency of share 
repurchase programs among firms.3  Out of the ten share repurchase announcements 
made between 1995 to 2005, Cogeco Cable Inc. partially fulfilled five announcements 
(3% to 62% completion rate) and did not fulfill four announcements at all. One 
announcement is still pending. Similarly, the Bank of Montreal, one of the largest 
Canadian banks, made six share repurchase announcements during this period. It fulfilled 
one announcement completely and four announcements partially (34% to 92% 
completion rate).  It did not follow through on one announcement.  While Dundee Realty 
                                                 
 
2 See Table 3-1 for a summary of the extant literature on share repurchase announcement 
abnormal returns. 
Besides open-market share repurchases, firms can use tender offers or Dutch auctions as 
a method to repurchase shares.  However, open-market share repurchases are by far the 
most popular method to repurchase shares.  This paper only analyzes open-market share 
repurchases.  Therefore, for the remainder of this paper share repurchase, stock buyback, 
and repurchase program all refer to open-market share repurchases. 
3 In Canada, due to TSX regulations, share repurchase programs are valid for a period of 
12 months.  Therefore, each column of data in Figure 1-2 represents a separate share 
repurchase program.  
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Corporation made four announcements and fulfilled all of them almost completely.  The 
company in example 1 can be described as a firm with a reputation for fully completing 
its announced share repurchase programs.  On the other hand, the company in example 2 
can be described as a firm with a reputation for not completing (or even attempting to 
complete) its announced share repurchase programs.  Therefore, it is likely that the 
market would regard any future share repurchase announcement by the company in 
example 1 as “credible”.  However, any future repurchase announcement for the firm in 
example 2 will likely be perceived as less “credible”.  Accordingly, the market may use 
the reputation of a repurchasing firm to evaluate the credibility of the repurchase 
announcement when analyzing the informational content of the share repurchase 
announcement. 
Until recently, studies on share repurchases have overlooked the fact that, unlike 
other corporate events, share repurchase announcements are not firm commitments.  That 
is, there is a degree of uncertainty to the likelihood that a firm will actually follow-
through on its announced intentions.  The firms that fail to substantially meet their past 
share repurchase commitments, obviously, are less likely to attract market attention with 
their future announcements.  In other words, the credibility and reputation established 
through the fulfillment of past commitments may play a crucial role in the evaluation of 
the informational content of a share repurchase announcement.  For example, Oded 
(2005) speculates “reputation effects can provide an alternative explanation for the 
announcement return without a commitment to repurchase.”  However, Oded does not 
examine this issue empirically.  Similarly, Chan et al. (2004) and Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) suggest the possible role of credibility and reputational effects in the explanation 
of the cross-sectional variation of abnormal price reactions around share repurchase 
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announcements.  However, this issue has not been extensively examined to date.  We 
attempt to resolve the void in the current literature by investigating how credibility and 
reputation implicit in the past behavior of announcing firms affect the market reaction to 
their subsequent share repurchase announcements.   
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Example 1 - Dundee Realty Corporation 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
# of shares announced to be repurchased (in millions) 14.3 11.9 1.3 1.0
# of shares actually repurchased (in millions) 14.3 11.8 1.3 1.0
Completion Rate 100% 99% 100% 100%  
 
Example 2 – Cogeco Cable Inc. 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
# of shares announced to be repurchased (in thousands) 277 275 567 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
# of shares actually repurchased (in thousands) 49 169 61 31 6 0 0 0 0
Completion Rate 18% 62% 11% 13% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
 
Example 3 – Bank of Montreal 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
# of shares announced to be repurchase (in millions) 10.0 7.5 10.0 52.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
# of shares actually repurchases (in millions) 9.2 0.0 7.9 52.0 5.1 7.5
Completion Rate 92% 0% 79% 100% 34% 50%
 
Figure 1-2.  Firm-specific examples of share repurchase histories 
Figure 1-2 provides the details for open-market share repurchase programs conducted between 1995 and 
2005 for three companies listed on the TSX.  In Canada, due to TSX regulations, share repurchase 
programs are valid for a period of 12 months.  Each column of data represents an individual share 
repurchase program.  The first row of each example is the number of shares intended to be repurchased at 
the announcement of the repurchase program.  The second row is the actual number of shares repurchased 
over the 12 months following the repurchase announcement.  The third row is the completion rate of the 
share repurchase program, calculated as the number of shares actually repurchased (row 2) divided by the 
target number of shares (row 1).  Dundee Realty Corporation (now named Dundee Real Estate Investment 
Trust) is one of Canada’s major real estate management companies; the company focuses on owning, 
acquiring, leasing and managing mid-sized urban and suburban office and industrial properties in Canada.  
Cogeco Cable Inc. is one of Canada’s largest providers of multimedia video and audio services, high-speed 
Internet, and digital telephony services.  The Bank of Montreal is one of Canada’s largest banks with 
operations in retail and investment banking and personal wealth management.  The bank also has minor 
operations in the U.S.  
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We use detailed information of the completion of share repurchase programs of 
the firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) to study the possibility that market 
participants evaluate the credibility of a firm’s share repurchase announcement based on 
the actual completion rates of a firm’s past repurchase programs.4  We believe that 
Canadian share repurchase programs provide an optimal venue to examine this issue in 
two major grounds. First, Canada has a relatively long history of open-market share 
repurchases programs.5 Second, unlike the U.S., Canada has a more transparent 
regulatory environment and mandatory reporting requirements for open-market share 
repurchase programs.  For example, in the words of Ikenberry et al. (2000):    
Canadian data are of particular interest, however, because firms must 
report each month the number of shares they actually repurchase. This 
information is summarized by the exchanges and published on a timely 
basis.  Precise, periodic information on repurchase activity does not 
exist for U.S. firms. Moreover, U.S. reporting conventions even make it 
difficult to obtain good estimates of overall completion rates (Stephens 
and Weisbach (1998)). Our unique data allow us to accurately measure 
program completion rates and examine factors that affect these 
managerial decisions.6 
 
In a sample of 1,507 share repurchase announcements from 1995 to 2005, we find 
a positive relationship between a firm’s prior share repurchase completion rate and the 
abnormal return observed on the subsequent share repurchase announcement.  We 
                                                 
 
4 In Canada, open-market share repurchase programs are referred to as normal course 
issuer bids (NCIB) and fixed-price tender offers are referred to as substantial issuer bids.  
In the remainder of the paper, share repurchase program or simply, repurchase program, 
will refer to a normal course issuer bid. 
5 Kim et al. (2004) infer that U.S. disclosure requirements for share repurchases are 
among the least stringent compared to other countries.   
6 Ikenberry et al. (2000), p. 2375.  Parentheses are those of the original authors. 
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interpret this result as evidence that investors react more positively to the share 
repurchase announcements of “credible” firms compared to the firms that lack credibility.  
In addition, consistent with Ikenberry et al. (2001), we report that the average completion 
rate for Canadian share repurchase programs is approximately 31 percent over the sample 
period. 
Our study most closely relates to Stephens and Weisbach (1998), who examine 
the market reaction to ex-post completion rates and Chen et al. (2004), who make 
reference to and control for the ex-post completion rates in their analysis.  Similarly, our 
research also relates to Ikenberry et al. (2000), who study the completion rates for share 
repurchases of Canadian firms.  However, we substantially deviate from these studies and 
extend this strand of literature, as we specifically examine if a firm’s reputation for 
completing past share repurchase announcements affects the market reaction to the firm’s 
future share repurchase announcements.  Our research is groundbreaking in investigating 
the measurement and the impact of credibility as the past literature is practically mute in 
this issue.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a 
summary of share repurchase regulation and disclosure requirements in Canada.  A 
discussion of the related literature is provided in Section 3.  Section 4 provides a 
description of the sample and discusses the event study methodology.  Section 5 presents 
the results and discusses the variables that are used as a proxy measure for a firm’s 
credibility of its share repurchase announcement.  Finally, Section 6 offers concluding 
remarks.   
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CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF CANADIAN SHARE REPURCHASE MARKET REGULATION 
Share repurchase programs are a recent phenomenon and have only been in 
widespread use in the U.S. since the 1980s.7  In 1982, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 10b-18 which, under certain conditions, provides a safe 
harbor to repurchasing corporations from litigation relating to price manipulation.  Prior 
to the implementation of Rule 10b-18, U.S. corporations that repurchased shares in the 
open-market faced the risk of violating the Securities Exchange Act’s provisions against 
price manipulation.  Although many countries have recently permitted share repurchase 
transactions, Canada is one of the only countries outside of the U.S. that has a reasonably 
long open-market share repurchase history.8   
Canadian data is also of particular interest because companies are required to 
report share repurchase activity to the TSX on a monthly basis.  In the U.S., firms are not 
required to disclose or report repurchase activity to regulators and no disclosure system is 
set up to allow the public to track repurchase activity.  In most aspects of the financial 
                                                 
 
7 See Cook, et al. (2003) for an overview of SEC regulation for open-market repurchases.    
8 Outside of the U.S., share repurchases have only recently become a popular means of 
distributing cash flows to investors.  For many of the world’s ten largest stock markets 
(Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Hong Kong), share repurchases were only permitted in the late 1990s.  
See Kim et al. (2004) for a survey of international open market share repurchase 
regulations. 
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markets, the U.S. is seen as a leader in terms of disclosure and market transparency for 
corporate events such as insider trading activity and equity offerings.  However, Kim et 
al. (2004) find that U.S. regulators do not enforce the same standards with respect to 
open-market share repurchases.  In many other countries, share repurchases are strictly 
regulated in regards to disclosure and implementation. However, disclosure requirements 
in the U.S are among the least stringent compared to other major financial markets in the 
world.  Recent studies criticize the current share repurchase regulation in the U.S. and 
suggest that the SEC should increase the transparency of share repurchase programs in 
order to promote the efficiency and fairness of financial markets (see Fried, 2005; Cook 
et al., 2003; Kracher and Johnson, 1997). 
Similar to the U.S, the board of directors must approve any share repurchase 
program in Canada.  However, shareholder approval is not needed to initiate a share 
repurchase program.9  Companies must file a notice of intention to the TSX for approval 
before initiating an open-market share repurchase program.  Although the exchange 
warns that “a notice is not to be filed if the issuer does not have a present intention to 
purchase shares,” no form of disciplinary action is afforded to those firms that do not 
actually acquire shares.10   In addition, it is mandatory for a repurchasing firm to issue a 
press release indicating that it has applied to the exchange for approval of a share 
                                                 
 
9 Kim et al. (2004) report that in many European countries, shareholder approval is 
required to initiate a repurchase program. 
10 See Section 6-501 (6) of Appendix F of the TSX Company Manual (effective January 
1, 2005). 
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repurchase program.11  The press release must include the number of shares sought, the 
reason for the share repurchase, and the amount of any repurchases in the previous 12-
month period.  The application process is more of a formality that acts as a notification to 
the exchange that a firm is going to implement a share repurchase program.  Accordingly, 
the application process is usually completed in a limited number of days and firms may 
commence repurchasing shares two days after receiving approval from the TSX.  A share 
repurchase program expires 12 months after approval is official.  The maximum number 
of shares permitted for repurchase is the greater of (i) 5 percent of shares outstanding, or 
(ii) 10 percent of the public float.  Furthermore, a company cannot purchase more than 2 
percent of shares outstanding in a 30-day period.  Firms are also restricted from 
repurchasing shares at a price that is greater than the most recent independent trade price 
(up-tick rule).12  Companies may also use only one broker to make repurchases and the 
identity of the broker must be reported to the TSX.   
In addition to the initial share repurchase application, companies must report to 
the TSX, on a monthly basis, any repurchase activity within 10 days of the end of each 
                                                 
 
11 In the majority of share repurchase announcements, the press release indicates that the 
repurchasing firm has applied to the exchange for approval of a share repurchase 
program.  However, some firms issue a press release indicating the TSX’s approval of the 
share repurchase program in lieu of the press release indicating the application for a 
repurchase program.  The difference between the application date and the date of 
approval of the share repurchase program is minimal and is usually only one or two days.   
12 The TSX defines the independent trade price as the price resulting from transactions 
that are not related to any share repurchase transactions or to any transaction by insiders 
of the company. 
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month.  On the third Friday of every month, the TSX publishes a summary containing the 
status of every current share repurchase program.13   
 
                                                 
 
13 See Appendix D, Figure D-1 for an example of a share repurchase summary distributed 
by the TSX. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
At the time that Miller and Modigliani (1961) conducted their seminal research on 
payout policy, open-market share repurchases, in all practicality, did not exist.  However, 
their theory implies that with “perfect markets, rational behavior, and perfect certainty,” 
no difference in firm value should result from different payout policies.  Firm value is 
determined by the underlying cash-flows of the firm, not how the cash-flows are 
distributed.  A repurchase is identical to a dividend payment if, during a share repurchase 
program, every shareholder sells identical proportions of shares which results in the same 
proportional control of the firm after the share repurchase is complete.  When a firm 
repurchases shares, the cash used in the repurchase decreases the firm’s assets and the 
shares actually repurchased decreases the firm’s equity.   
In efficient and perfect markets, Miller and Modigliani’s irrelevance proposition 
of payout policy may hold.  However, in the presence of market imperfections, payout 
policy may have an effect on firm value.  Table 3-1 provides a summary of the empirical 
findings for short and long-term abnormal returns for firms that announce a share 
repurchase program.14  Empirical studies observe, on average, a 2 to 3.5 percent short-
                                                 
 
(continued …) 
 
14 It is common for studies that examine share repurchases that include 1987 in the 
sample period to exclude announcements made in the fourth quarter of 1987 due to the 
surge in repurchase announcements following the crash in October of that year.  For 
example, Ikenberry et al. (1995) report 777 firms announced share repurchase programs 
following the 1987 crash.  To put this into perspective, their entire sample of repurchases 
 14
term abnormal return for U.S. companies that announce a share repurchase program. In 
Canada, researchers find the short-term abnormal return associated with share 
repurchases to be lower than in the U.S.  Canadian repurchasers experience an 
announcement abnormal return of 0.93 to 1.30 percent.  Furthermore, U.S. companies 
that announce share repurchases display abnormal long-term returns ranging from 8 to 18 
percent.  In Canada, researchers have found similar magnitudes for long-term post-
announcement returns.   
                                                 
(… continued) 
from 1980-1990 (excluding the fourth quarter of 1987) includes 1239 firms.  That is, the 
amount of share repurchases announced in the fourth quarter of 1987 accounts for nearly 
40 percent of the total amount of repurchases announced in the ten year period from 1980 
to 1990.  Furthermore, Comment and Jarrell (1991) “find that repurchases announced 
during the 9 weeks following the crash are associated with positive returns that are not 
significantly different from the average return outside this period.”  Comment and Jarrell 
(1991) also suggest the role of credibility in the share repurchase announcement: “We 
also present evidence that, consistent with signaling theory, investors treat signals of 
undervaluation based on superior macro-economic information with less credibility than 
they do signals based on superior firm-specific information.”      
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Table 3-1.  Summary of empirical findings of share repurchase announcement abnormal 
returns 
Study Country Sample Period Event Window CAR n
Short-term Abnormal Return
Ikenberry et al. (2000) Canada 1989-1997 Month of announcement 0.93% 1,060
Li and McNally (2005) Canada 1987-2000 -1 to +2 days 0.73% 901
McNally (2002) Canada 1988-2000 -1 to +4 days 1.30% 396
Vermaelen (1981) U.S. 1970-1978 -1 to +1 days 3.62% 243
Comment and Jarrell (1991) U.S. 1984-1989 -1 to +1 days 2.30% 1,037
Ikenberry et. al (1995) U.S. 1980-1990 -2 to +2 days 3.54% 1,239
Chan et al (2004) U.S. 1980-1996 -2 to +2 days 2.46% 5,508
Grullon and Michaely (2004) U.S. 1980-1997 -1 to +1 days 2.71% 4,443
Long-term Abnormal Return
Ikenberry et al. (2000) Canada 1989-1997 2 year 14.88% 1,060
McNally (2002) Canada 1988-2000 1 year 9.73% 396
Ikenberry et al. (1995) U.S. 1980-1990 3 year 8.69% 1,239
Chan et al. (2004) U.S. 1980-1996 1 year 6.68% 5,508
Chan et al. (2004) U.S. 1980-1996 2 year 10.97% 5,382
 
 
Table 3-1 provides a summary of the results from selected studies for the abnormal return on the 
announcement of a share repurchase program.  Results are provided for both short and long-term event 
horizons.  
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3.1  Why Do Companies Repurchase Stock? 
The literature focuses on five main motivations for share repurchases that may 
explain the abnormal returns observed on the announcement of repurchase programs.  
These hypotheses imply that management use open-market share repurchases to:  (1) 
signal to the market in response to a mispricing of the company’s stock, (2) disgorge free 
cash-flow, (3) alter capital structure, (4) increase earnings per share (EPS) and/or offset 
dilutionary effects of employee stock options, or (5) exploit dividend/capital gains 
taxation differentials.  There is not a single, all-explaining theory to open-market share 
repurchases.  Depending on the circumstances of the repurchasing company, a firm may 
have a number of motivations to buy back its own stock. 
3.1.1  Signaling and/or undervaluation hypothesis 
 Although other theories contribute to the explanation of the observed price 
performance surrounding share repurchase announcements, the signaling hypothesis has 
become the predominant theory in explaining the causes and effects of share repurchases 
(see Vermaelen, 1981; Dann, 1981; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Comment and Jarrell, 
1991; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995).        
The basis for signaling theory is the existence of asymmetric information between 
management and investors.  In all likelihood, managers will possess privileged 
information regarding the future performance of the firm.  One medium a manager can 
use to convey any positive, non-public information to the market is through the 
announcement of a share repurchase program.  If managers assess that the firm is 
undervalued at current stock prices, then they may repurchase shares to the benefit of 
long-term shareholders.  In fact, McNally et al. (2006) find that trades of repurchasing 
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firms exhibit firm-specific timing ability since firms tend to actively repurchase during 
short-run dips in the price of their shares.  The authors suggest that this provides evidence 
that the private information of management leads to asymmetric information between the 
firm and the market. 
Brav et al. (2005), in a survey of 167 financial executives of repurchasing firms, 
find a strong consensus among company executives that view payout policy as an 
effective method to convey information to investors.  The most popular answer provided 
by financial executives for the rationale of share repurchases is that “repurchase decisions 
convey information about our company.”15  Similarly, in a separate survey, Baker et al. 
(2003) find that undervaluation is the most cited reason for repurchasing stock among 
managers.  This suggests that signaling is one of the main motivations for corporate 
managers to repurchase shares. 
In most signaling models, there is a cost to firms associated with the signaling 
action.  This cost prevents overvalued firms from mimicking undervalued firms.  In the 
case of dividend initiations or increases, the cost of the signaling mechanism is the 
dispersion of future cash-flows to shareholders.  However, with share repurchases, there 
is no substantial cost to initiate a share repurchase program.  The cost arises when (or if) 
the firm actually pays out cash in order to acquire shares in the open-market.  Unlike a 
dividend initiation or increase, a share repurchase program is not a firm commitment and 
                                                 
 
15 The question, “Do these statements agree with your company’s views,” is asked in the 
survey, along with nine statements as optional answers.  “Repurchase decisions convey 
information about our company to investors” is the most popular response, with 85 
percent of respondents selecting agree or strongly agree for the statement. 
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there is no guarantee that an announcing firm will have to bear any future costs associated 
with the repurchase program (i.e. acquire shares in the future).  Since announcing a 
repurchase program is costless (in a monetary sense), both undervalued and overvalued 
firms can announce their intentions to repurchase.  Therefore, in an environment of 
costless signaling, the credibility of the announcement and the reputation of the 
announcing firm may play a crucial role in the explanation of any abnormal return 
observed on the date of the announcement.  The loss of credibility and reputation from 
not following through with a share repurchase announcement may be perceived as a cost 
associated with false signaling.         
Much of the research investigating the signaling aspect of share repurchases 
focuses on determining the firm-specific factors that result in a stronger price response to 
a share repurchase announcement.  Probably the most convincing evidence in favor of the 
signaling/undervaluation hypothesis is the observation that share repurchase programs are 
preceded by negative abnormal stock price performance (see Stewart, 1976; Vermaelen, 
1981; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; McNally, 1999).  
Furthermore, multivariate analysis confirms a negative relationship between the 
announcement abnormal return and pre-announcement price performance (see Stephens 
and Weisbach, 1998; Kahle, 2002; Chan et al., 2004).  That is, the market reacts more 
favorably to a share repurchase announcement when firms experience a price decline 
prior to the announcement.   
Jagannathan et al. (2000) find that firms choosing to increase dividends, rather 
than repurchase shares, actually experience positive abnormal stock price performance 
prior to the dividend announcement.  Similarly, Baker et al. (2005) find that managers 
favor share repurchases over specially designated (one-time) dividends when 
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management views the firm’s stock to be undervalued.  This suggests that payout policy 
is somewhat dependant on management’s perception of mispricing in the market.  The 
extant literature argues that if the signaling/undervaluation hypothesis was invalid, we 
would not expect to see share repurchase announcements linked to stock price 
movements.   
If the signaling hypothesis relies on the existence of information asymmetries 
between managers and investors, then companies with greater asymmetries should be 
more inclined to utilize share repurchases as a means to convey information regarding 
any mispricings to the market.  Vermaelen (1981) suggests that “small firms are expected 
to signal more information when they repurchase their shares.”16  The author suggests 
that smaller firms may experience higher levels of information asymmetry due to (i) less 
coverage of smaller firms in the financial media, (ii) lower institutional ownership of 
small firms, and (iii) less scrutiny by financial analysts.  Accordingly, a number of studies 
find a negative relation between firm size and the abnormal return on the announcement 
of the repurchase program (see Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Grullon and Michaely 
2002, 2004; Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee, 2004).  That is, larger firms, which are less likely 
to experience information asymmetries, have lower announcement abnormal returns.      
3.1.2  Excess cash distribution and dividend substitution hypothesis 
 Managers have incentives to increase the size of the firms under their control by 
overinvesting in projects that may have negative net present values (NPV), even if these 
actions are not in the best interests of shareholders.  Jensen (1986) suggests that agency 
                                                 
 
16 See Vermaelen (1981), p.164. 
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costs, or the costs incurred due to the conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders, are particularly severe when a company generates substantial free cash-
flow.  The author suggests that paying out cash to shareholders reduces the resources 
under management’s control, and thus reduces the opportunity for management to 
overinvest in value destroying projects.  Therefore, the abnormal returns observed on the 
announcement of a share repurchase program may be due to the reduction in free cash 
(assuming the share repurchase program is actually implemented) and consequently, a 
reduction in the potential negative affects of agency problems. 
 Kahle (2002) and Li and McNally (2007) find that the amount of free cash-flow is 
positively related to the abnormal returns for repurchase announcements.  This suggests 
that the market reacts more favorably to firms that are susceptible to agency problems.  
Similarly, Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that the share repurchase announcement 
return is positively related to the overall level of cash in the firm.   In addition, the 
authors find that the relationship between the level of cash and the market reaction to the 
share repurchase announcement is stronger for firms that are more likely to overinvest 
(firms with a combination of low book-to-market values and high cash balances).  Their 
findings suggest that firms tend to reduce capital expenditures and cash reserves in the 
three years following the announcement of a share repurchase program.  The authors also 
find that repurchasing firms experience a decline in systematic risk and cost of capital, 
which may also explain the positive market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
 In the late 1990s, share repurchases replaced dividends as the main method of 
distributing cash to shareholders (see Figure 1-1).  Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that 
although the nominal value of dividends has increased year-over-year, the growth rate in 
dividend payments has declined from 15 percent in the 1970s to 4.6 percent in the 1990s.  
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The authors conclude that firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends and 
that the recent increase in share repurchases has come at the expense of lower dividend 
growth.  However, using a sample of Canadian firms, Li and McNally (2007) find that 
repurchasing firms tend to have higher dividend yields than non-repurchasing firms.  The 
authors suggest that, in Canada, repurchases are not a substitute for dividends.  However, 
their observation does not rule out the substitution hypothesis.  It may simply be that 
dividend paying firms are the most likely candidates for share repurchase programs (i.e. 
dividend paying firms are likely to have high free-cash flows) and firms may be replacing 
dividends with repurchases.  
Share repurchases and dividends are not perfect substitutes and corporate 
executives and investors view them very differently.  Compared to dividends, share 
repurchases do not represent the same long-term commitment to returning excess cash to 
shareholders.  The market views dividend payments as a quasi contract and managers 
have a strong aversion to dividend reductions.  Brav et al. (2005) interview corporate 
executives and find that many managers would pass up positive NPV investment projects 
before cutting dividends:  “today, some executives tell stories of selling assets, laying off 
a large number of employees, borrowing heavily, or bypassing positive NPV projects, 
before slaying the sacred cow by cutting dividends.”  Eighty-eight percent of respondents 
strongly agreed that there are negative consequences when dividends are reduced.  On the 
other hand, only 22.5 percent of executives believe that reducing repurchases has 
negative consequences.  Responses to the survey reinforce the view that managers prefer 
the flexibility of repurchases and dislike the rigidity of dividends.  That said, dividends 
do not seem to be based on residual cash flow, whereas share repurchases seem to follow 
a residual payout policy.   
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Jagannathan et al. (2000) find evidence that aggregate repurchases are evidently 
more volatile than dividend payments.  Consistent with the view that repurchases follow 
a residual payout policy, temporary cash flows are used to finance repurchases while 
sustainable cash flows are paid out as dividends.  They also find that the standard 
deviation of operating income for repurchasing firms is about double the standard 
deviation for dividend increasing firms.  Again, this suggests that cash flows for 
repurchasing firms are more uncertain than they are for dividend increasing firms.  They 
conclude that share repurchases do not appear to be replacing dividends, but rather 
repurchases serve as a role for paying out short-term cash flows to investors. 
3.1.3  Increasing earnings per share and/or offset dilution of employee stock options 
  The most cited justification for share repurchases, especially among corporate 
executives and the financial press, is the belief that repurchases increase EPS by 
decreasing the number of shares outstanding.17  In their survey of corporate executives, 
Brav et al. (2005) find that increasing earnings per share is the second most significant 
factor affecting a company’s share repurchase decision.18  Furthermore, a number of 
                                                 
 
17 A recent column, “Big Companies Put Record Sums Into Buybacks; Repurchases Aim 
to Bolster Shares but They Also Signal Hesitancy to Invest in Growth” (Wall Street 
Journal, June 12, 2006, p. A.1), reflects the common belief of the media in the 
causational relationship between share repurchases and accretive EPS.   
18 Seventy-six percent of respondents indicate “increasing earnings per share” as an 
important or very important factor in the share repurchase decision.  The most popular 
factor, among the ten offered in the survey, is “whether our stock is a good investment 
relative to other available investments” (78.9 percent indicate it is an important or very 
important factor).  The third most popular factor is “offsetting the dilutionary effect of 
stock option plans or other stock programs” (67.6 percent indicate it is an important or 
very important factor).   
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corporate executives interviewed could cite the precise numerical estimates of EPS given 
their repurchase program and knew what EPS would be if no shares were repurchased.        
If share repurchases reduce the number of shares outstanding and, assuming net 
income remains unaffected, it is possible for EPS to grow faster than net income.  
However, there are a couple of factors that may negate the perceived relationship 
between repurchases and EPS growth.  First, a share repurchase will increase earnings 
only if the funds designated for the repurchase would otherwise fail to earn the firm’s 
cost of capital, that is the firm’s investment opportunity set does not include any positive 
NPV projects.  If this is the circumstance, then investing in the company’s own stock is a 
better use of funds than other alternative investments.  If positive NPV investments exist, 
then executing a share repurchase may actually destroy shareholder value.   
Second, even if a company repurchases shares, it does not necessarily translate 
into a lower number of shares outstanding at the end of the repurchase program.  While a 
firm is repurchasing shares, it may also be issuing shares to fulfill employee stock 
options.  Studies have shown that the number of shares outstanding actually increases for 
many repurchasing firms.  Li and McNally (2007) find that for Canadian repurchasers the 
average number of shares outstanding actually rises by 4.7 percent, compared to a control 
sample of non-repurchasing firms that experience an increase of 10.0 percent in shares 
outstanding over the same time period.19 This implies that although most share 
                                                 
 
19 In Canada, securities trading law prohibits the sale of securities by a company during a 
share repurchase program (Ontario Securities Act, Part XX, Section 94. (8)). Therefore, 
any increase in the number of shares outstanding must be the result of the exercise of 
employee options or the result of the conversion of other convertible securities.  
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repurchase programs do not decrease the number of shares outstanding, repurchases slow 
the rate of dilution that is caused by the redemption of employee stock options.  Bens et 
al. (2003) and Kahle (2002) also conclude that many repurchase programs are used to 
offset the dilution effects of the exercise of employee stock options.  Brav et al.’s (2005) 
findings support this argument when their survey of corporate executives finds that the 
third most influential factor in the repurchase decision is to offset the dilutionary effect of 
employee stock option plans.20    
Hribar et al. (2004) report that only 19.9 percent of repurchasing firms increase 
EPS by one cent or more.  However, their results suggest that firms may use repurchases 
to compensate for earnings shortfalls.  Accretive repurchases occur more frequently to 
firms that had negative pre-repurchase earnings surprises and accretive repurchasing 
firms are less likely to meet or exceed expected earnings in the absence of a stock 
repurchase compared to a matched sample of non-repurchasing firms.  This suggests that 
repurchases are sometimes used to manage EPS in order to meet analysts’ consensus for 
earnings forecasts.         
3.1.4  Capital structure adjustment 
Altering capital structure is often cited in the literature as a motivation for firms to 
repurchase shares.  Corporations can use share repurchases to increase debt-to-equity 
ratios by lowering the total amount of equity (lowering the number of shares 
outstanding).  However, the empirical evidence in support of the capital structure 
adjustment hypothesis is less convincing.  First, the size of open-market share repurchase 
                                                 
 
20 See footnote 18.   
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programs are usually small (around 5 percent of shares outstanding).  Chan et al. (2004) 
report that firms that are most likely to be motivated to repurchase shares in order to alter 
capital structure (i.e. firms with low leverage compared to the industry average), do not 
have larger abnormal returns on the announcement of a share repurchase program.  
Furthermore, Brav et al. (2005) find that only 28.2 percent of corporate executives report 
that changing debt-to-equity ratios is an important factor when deciding to repurchase 
shares (a relatively low rating compared to the top three most popular responses).21  The 
empirical evidence points to more relevant factors contributing to the share repurchase 
decision, such as the signaling or free-cash flow hypotheses. 
3.1.5  Tax benefit of repurchases versus dividends 
 The tax benefit that arises due to the differential treatment of dividends versus 
capital gains is often cited as a reason for the benefits of share repurchases over 
dividends.  However, recent legislation in both Canada and the U.S. has made dividends 
more competitive from a tax perspective.  Furthermore, many institutions and 
corporations do not pay taxes on dividends.  Brav et al. (2005) find that executives 
indicate that tax implications are a minor consideration in the repurchase decision and do 
not play a primary role in the payout policy decision.  However, the narrowing of the tax 
differential over the last 15 years may explain the dampened announcement returns over 
the last few years.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that abnormal returns on repurchase 
announcements decrease after the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which 
significantly reduced the tax differential between dividends and capital gains.  The 
                                                 
 
21 See footnote 18. 
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authors also find that the abnormal return on the announcement of a share repurchase 
program is positively related to the tax differential between the top marginal tax rate on 
ordinary income and the top marginal tax rate on capital gains.  This evidence suggests 
that taxes have a minor effect on the market reaction to share repurchase announcements.       
3.2 Actual Acquisition of Shares in Repurchase Programs 
The extant literature has attempted to estimate the actual number of shares 
repurchased in share repurchase programs.  In addition, studies attempt to identify factors 
that lead to more intensive repurchasing activity.  The literature also examines the effect 
of actual share repurchase transactions on the prices and liquidity of the firm’s stock. 
3.2.1  Estimation of share repurchase completion rates 
Share repurchases are not a firm commitment and companies are not obligated to 
acquire shares after the share repurchase announcement.  Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
is one of the first studies to estimate share repurchase completion rates for a sample of 
U.S. share repurchase announcements.  Recall that U.S. firms are not required to report 
share repurchase activity to a regulatory body.  Therefore, the authors must estimate the 
number of actual shares repurchased by measuring either (i) changes in shares 
outstanding measured using data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
or (ii) cash-flow data from Compustat associated with share repurchase activity.  The 
estimate of the actual number of shares repurchased varies depending on the source of the 
data (i.e. CRSP or Compustat) and the different assumptions regarding the market price 
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of the share repurchase transactions.22  The authors find that the average size of a 
repurchase program is for 7 percent of total shares outstanding.  For the 36 months 
following the repurchase announcement, the average firm repurchases between 74 to 82 
percent of the initial number of shares stated in the repurchase announcement.23  For the 
12-month period following the announcement, the authors find a completion rate ranging 
from 46 to 70 percent.  However, there is substantial variance in the completion rates.  
Fifty-seven percent of firms repurchase more than 100 percent of the announced number 
of shares in the three years following the announcement. However, 17 percent of firms 
repurchase less than 20 percent of the announced number of shares over the same time 
horizon.  In the U.S., firms do not have to announce the intended time horizon of their 
share repurchase programs.  The relatively high completion rates may be due to the 
                                                 
 
22 The exact execution price of each share repurchase transaction is unknown.  Therefore, 
the authors assume that companies repurchase shares at the average stock price over the 
period of the share repurchase program.  The completion rate is calculated by first 
estimating the number of shares repurchased by dividing the total dollar value spent on 
repurchases (Compustat’s Purchases of Common and Preferred Stock, data item #115) by 
the average share price over the 3-year repurchasing period.  The completion rate is then 
calculated by dividing the estimate of the actual number of shares repurchased by the 
number of shares targeted for repurchase at the time of the share repurchase 
announcement.  
23 Stephens and Weisbach’s (1998) completion rate estimate assumes that companies halt 
the acquisition of shares once the share repurchase program has acquired 100 percent of 
the target number of shares.  However, in their sample many firms repurchase a 
substantial greater number of shares than the target stated at announcement.  If this 
assumption is relaxed, the average completion rate is 266 percent for the three years 
following the announcement.  Using a similar methodology, Jagannathan and Stephens 
(2003) also find high average completion rates in the range of 100.7 to 134.7 percent in 
the two years following the repurchase announcement.  
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assumed 3-year length of the acquisition period, which may be longer than most firms’ 
desired acquisition periods. 
 Ikenberry et al. (2000) study the completion rates for share repurchases of 
Canadian firms.  Since Canadian firms must report repurchase activity to the TSX, the 
exact number of shares actually repurchased is known and it is not necessary to estimate 
actual repurchases using cash-flow or shares outstanding data.  In Canada, companies 
must apply for approval of a share repurchase program before acquiring any shares.  
Upon approval, the share repurchase program expires in 12 months and companies must 
reapply for approval before acquiring additional shares.  The authors report that the 
average repurchase program targets 5.22 percent of shares outstanding.  They find that 
the average completion rate for share repurchase programs is 28.6 percent for the 12-
month period following the repurchase announcement, with about half of all repurchase 
activity occurring within 3 months of the announcement date.  Only 14.5 percent of firms 
repurchase a substantial number of the announcement target (75 to 100 percent 
completion rates).  Surprisingly, the authors find that 22.3 percent of firms fail to acquire 
any shares during the repurchase program.  Approximately 60 percent of firms acquire 
less than 25 percent of the targeted number of shares in the repurchase program.   
Due to the lack of regulation and disclosure requirements and the unclear 
durations of repurchase programs in the U.S., direct comparisons of completion rates 
between Canada and the U.S. is not very meaningful.  U.S. completion rates must be 
estimated using cash-flow data or changes in the number of shares outstanding, whereas 
the actual number of shares repurchased by Canadian firms is reported directly to the 
TSX.   
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3.2.2  Factors that determine share repurchase completion rates 
 Numerous studies have attempted to identify factors that affect the number of 
shares actually acquired in share repurchase programs (see Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; 
Ikenberry et al., 2000; Kahle, 2002; Cook et al., 2004; McNally et al., 2006).  All of the 
studies find a negative relationship between past returns and share repurchase activity.  
That is, companies actively repurchase shares following abnormal stock price declines 
and are less inclined to repurchase when prices have risen.  If prices rise after a share 
repurchase announcement, the incentive to repurchase decreases (i.e. the firm’s stock is 
less “undervalued”) and firms may not follow through on their original share repurchase 
intentions.  This conditional behavior provides evidence that managers strategically 
repurchase shares when they perceive their stock to be temporarily undervalued and 
refrain from repurchasing when stock prices are relatively high.   
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Kahle (2002) find that share acquisitions are 
positively correlated with cash-flow, suggesting that firms that have excess cash are more 
likely to repurchase shares.  In addition, Kahle (2002) suggests that share repurchase 
activity is greater for firms that have outstanding employee stock options. 
3.2.3  Effect of share repurchases on liquidity and prices 
McNally et al. (2006) and Cook et al. (2004) find that companies utilize limit 
orders when repurchasing shares, suggesting that firms repurchase shares in an attempt to 
provide liquidity and buffer sell-side pressure in order to provide price support for falling 
stock prices.   McNally et al. (2006) find that, on average, share repurchases for TSX 
listed firms account for 12.25 percent of total trading volume during the repurchase 
program period.   
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Using survey results from 64 U.S. firms24, Cook et al. (2004) find that, on 
average, repurchases for firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) represent 
6.6 percent of total trading volume over the course of the entire repurchase program while 
NASDAQ repurchases represent 10.4 percent of aggregate trading volume.  On actual 
repurchasing days, NYSE firms’ repurchases account for 19.48 percent of average daily 
trading volume and NASDAQ repurchases account for 33.03 percent daily trading 
volume.  The average program length varies from 195 days (with 88 days of 
repurchasing) for NYSE companies and 116 days (with 16 days of repurchasing) for 
NASDAQ listed companies.  Firms also wait an average of 17 days following the 
announcement of a repurchase program to make their first repurchasing trade.   
A number of studies have examined the effect of share repurchases on liquidity, 
as measured by the bid-ask spread.  Cook et al. (2004) find that share repurchase activity 
increases liquidity, resulting in narrower bid-ask spreads on days surrounding share 
repurchase transactions.  However, Brockman and Cheung (2001) argue that share 
repurchases cause a widening of the bid-ask spread due to information asymmetries and 
informed trading by repurchasing firms in Hong Kong.  Accordingly, Barclay and Smith 
(1988) also report that share repurchases result in higher bid-ask spreads for U.S. firms. 
                                                 
 
24 Cook et al. (2004) sent questionnaires to 478 repurchasing firms identified in SDC’s 
Merger and Acquisitions Database between 1993 and 1994, of which 64 responded.  The 
questionnaire asked firms to provide detailed information of their share repurchase 
programs, including the date (as well as the intraday time of the trade), size, and price of 
every share repurchase transaction.  In addition, the firms were also asked to disclosure 
the identity of the broker used to repurchase shares. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
The initial sample consists of all open-market share repurchases initiated between 
December 1, 1994 and December 31, 2005 for companies listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX).  Once a month, the TSX publishes the current status of all share 
repurchase programs in the Daily Record.25  Each share repurchase summary provides 
the issuer’s name, expiry date of repurchase program, maximum number of shares 
authorized for repurchase, percentage of total shares outstanding targeted for repurchase, 
type of security to be repurchased, number of shares repurchased in the previous month, 
and total number of shares repurchased to date.   
                                                
During the sample period, there were a total of 3,086 repurchase programs 
initiated.  We exclude all repurchases that are for income trust units (320), preferred 
shares (34), debentures (60), warrants (15), and notes (4).  For firms announcing 
concurrent repurchase programs for more than one type of common share (i.e. dual-class 
voting share structures), we include the repurchase program for subordinate voting shares 
 
 
25 The Daily Record is a publication distributed by the TSX at the end of every trading 
day that includes the statistical highlights for the day’s trading.  On the third Friday of 
every month, the TSX includes a section on “Normal Course Issuer Bids” that includes 
information on the status of all current share repurchase programs.  As of 2005, the TSX 
has also included share repurchase summaries in their monthly publication, the TSX E-
Review.  See Appendix D for an excerpt of the share repurchase summary published in 
the Daily Record. 
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but exclude any repurchase programs for multiple voting shares (165).26  Furthermore, 
due to mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies, and name changes, another 30 companies 
were unidentifiable in the CFMRC database.   
Security price data is obtained from the Canadian Financial Markets Research 
Center (CFMRC) Summary Information Database.27  For cross-sectional analysis, we 
obtain accounting data from Compustat.  Share repurchase announcement dates are 
obtained from Security Data Corporation’s SDC Platinum: Non-U.S. Mergers and 
Acquisitions database.  The SDC database does not include all of the share repurchase 
announcements that are reported in the Daily Record.  For repurchase programs not found 
in the SDC database, we obtain announcement dates from the original press release for 
the share repurchase.  Press releases are obtained from the System for Electronic 
Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR).28  We are unable to determine 
announcement dates for a further 177 repurchase programs.    Therefore, our initial 
                                                 
 
26 For firms that conduct concurrent repurchase programs for both subordinate voting 
shares and multiple voting shares, the exclusion of subordinate voting repurchase 
programs prevents the double counting of these firms’ repurchase programs into our 
sample.  Furthermore, the market for multiple voting shares is often less liquid compared 
to the market for subordinate voting shares.   
27 The CFMRC database is the Canadian equivalent to the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) U.S. Stock Database.  Name changes, takeovers and acquisitions, 
and amalgamations are identified using the FPinfomart - Predecessor & Defunct 
database, which is maintained in coordination with the Financial Post, one of Canada’s 
leading financial newspapers.  
28 SEDAR is the Canadian equivalent to the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval system (EDGAR) for U.S. companies. 
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sample consists of 2,281 common share repurchase programs initiated by 752 different 
companies.29 
The construction of the data set used in this study is a formidable contribution in 
itself.  No electronic database exists that contains historical Canadian share repurchase 
data.  Therefore, a database of share repurchase programs was compiled from the original 
hard-copies of the TSX’s Daily Record.30  The collection of the data required a 
substantial investment of time, taking close to three months (and approximately 500 
working hours) to record over three thousand individual share repurchase programs and 
the associated data for each program.  Each entry was carefully scrutinized at least twice.  
Furthermore, additional time was devoted to data verification and a comprehensive audit 
was performed to identify and investigate any erroneous share repurchase entries.  We 
identify any outliers in the data (e.g. share repurchase programs with completion rates 
greater than 100 percent) and investigate whether the data recorded for the repurchase 
program is the actual data contained in the Daily Record.  We also compare the 
                                                 
 
29 The SDC database includes 1,551 share repurchase announcements.  For the remaining 
730 share repurchase programs, we obtain announcement dates from SEDAR. 
30 Original copies of the Daily Record are obtained from the library at the University of 
Alberta.  The library has original hard-copies of the Daily Record dating back to January 
of 1996.  Therefore, our sample begins with the December, 1995 share repurchase 
summary report that was published on the third Friday of the following month, or the 
January 19, 1996 edition of the Daily Record.  However, the share repurchases that 
expired in December, 1995 commenced twelve months prior to the expiry dates and were 
announced in December of 1994.  Therefore, our sample consists of share repurchases 
announced between December, 1994 and December, 2005.  The University of Alberta has 
pre-1996 copies of the Daily Record available in microfilm.  Unfortunately, the share 
repurchase summaries are illegible in the microfilm format and we were unable to include 
pre-1996 copies of the publication into our sample. 
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announcement dates for share repurchase transactions recorded in the SDC database to 
the corresponding dates that are implied in the TSX Daily Record and investigate any 
differences by referring to the actual share repurchase announcement press release. 
Many firms announce more than one share repurchase program over the sample 
period.  Figure 4-1 provides the frequency of the number of share repurchases over the 
sample period for each firm.  The majority of companies in the sample (272 firms or 36 
percent of firms) announce only one share repurchase program over the sample period.  
The number of firms that announce multiple repurchase programs steadily declines, from 
149 firms, or 20 percent of firms, that conduct two repurchase programs to 3 firms that 
conduct eleven repurchase programs (or one repurchase program in every year of the 
sample period).  The average firm that conducts multiple share repurchase programs 
allows 473 days to lapse before initiating another share repurchase program.  Our sample 
includes many firms that announce consecutive repurchase programs:  1,390 of the 2,281 
repurchase announcements, or 61 percent, occur within 750 days (approximately 2 years) 
and 896, or 39 percent of repurchases, occur within 375 days.  This is similar to 
Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) who document that 47.5 percent of U.S. repurchasers 
announced at least two repurchase programs within their five-year sample period.   
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Figure 4-1.  Frequency of share repurchase announcements 
Figure 4-1 presents a histogram of the frequency of share repurchases for each firm over the sample period, 
December of 1994 to December of 2005.  The frequency of announcements is the number of times an 
individual  firm announces a share repurchase program over the sample period. 
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4.1 Share Repurchase Activity and Completion Rates 
 The number of Canadian share repurchase announcements varies substantially 
over time.  Figure 4-2 reports the number of share repurchase announcements for each 
year of the sample.  Repurchase announcements peaked in 2000 at 315, but have declined 
in recent years to under 200 announcements in 2005.  Figure 4-2 also provides the target 
number of shares announced for repurchase programs and the actual number of shares 
acquired in the 12 months following the announcement.  Although the number of share 
repurchase announcements (represented by the solid line in Figure 4-2) has decreased 
since 2003, the target number of shares (represented by the shaded bar in Figure 4-2) 
actually increases.  In fact, the number of shares targeted for repurchase reaches a 
maximum of 887 million shares in 2005, even though the number of announcements in 
2005 is only 172.  Perhaps this is a result of more large-cap firms initiating repurchase 
programs and small-cap firms tending not to repurchase as frequently relative to earlier 
years in the sample.  Table 4-1 indicates that the mean market capitalization of 
announcing firms is larger in the later years of the sample. 
The completion rate for Canadian share repurchases is surprisingly low.  The 
average completion rate for equity share repurchases initiated between December of 1994 
to December of 2004 is 31.3 percent (median of 18.3 percent) over the twelve months 
following the repurchase announcement. 31  For comparison, our findings are very similar 
                                                 
 
31 Although share repurchase announcements occurring in 2005 will be used in the event 
study and multivariate analysis, it is not possible (at the time of writing) to calculate the 
completion rates of repurchases announced in 2005 because many of the repurchase 
programs have not yet expired.   
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to the 28.6 mean completion rate reported by Ikenberry et al. (2000) for a sample of 
Canadian firms announcing share repurchases between 1989 and 1998.  However, the 
completion rates for Canadian repurchases are lower than the estimated completion rates 
for U.S repurchases.  Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find completion rates of 46 to 70 
percent over the one year following the repurchase announcement.  Not surprisingly, the 
completion rate varies over time.  As Table 4-1 indicates, the mean completion rate varies 
from a low of 19 percent in 2003 to a high of nearly 40 percent in 1999.   
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Figure 4-2.  Share repurchase activity in Canada between 1995 and 2005 
Number of shares announced to be repurchased per year and the number of shares actually repurchased 
over the subsequent year of the announcement (represented by vertical bars).  Number of share repurchase 
announcements per year (represented by line) is measured on the right axis.  
 
 
Table 4-1.  Share repurchase announcements, completion rates, and average size of 
announcing firms 
Mean Mean Market 
Number of Completion Capitalization of
Year Announcements Rate Repurchasing Firms*
1995 102 37.2% 1,189.7
1996 120 35.5% 1,641.3
1997 176 32.9% 1,446.7
1998 255 37.4% 1,293.4
1999 288 39.6% 1,714.5
2000 315 36.1% 1,442.1
2001 255 25.1% 1,705.7
2002 211 22.4% 2,484.3
2003 202 19.4% 2,962.4
2004 177 26.5% 4,117.6
2005 172 4,339.2
Entire Sample 2281 31.3% 2,212.5
* (in millions of dollars)  
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Figure 4-3 provides the distribution of the completion rates of share repurchase 
programs.  Surprisingly, 424 repurchasing programs (or approximately 20 percent of the 
sample) fail to repurchase any shares in the twelve months subsequent to the 
announcement of the program.  The majority of firms, 662 (or 31 percent of the sample), 
repurchase between 0 and 20 percent of the targeted amount of shares stated at 
announcement. Approximately 52 percent of firms repurchase less than 20 percent of the 
number of shares stated at announcement.  Only 289 firms (14 percent of sample) 
repurchase between 80 and 100 percent of the announced number of shares.  Eight firms 
repurchase more shares than stated at announcement, however the excess repurchases are 
very minimal in most cases (the highest completion rate in the sample is 165 percent).         
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Figure 4-3.  Histogram of distribution of share repurchase completion rates 
Figure 4-3 illustrates the distribution of the completion rates for share repurchase programs included in our 
sample.   
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4.2 Event Study Methodology 
 In order to determine whether the market evaluates the informational content of a 
share repurchase based on the credibility of the share repurchase announcement, a 
measurement of the price response to the announcement is needed.  This study relies on 
standard event-study methodology to calculate the abnormal return on the announcement 
of share repurchase program.  We use the single factor market model of Brown and 
Warner (1985).  According to the market model, the abnormal return on a given trading 
day is calculated as:  
    (4.1) tmiititi RRAR ,,, ˆˆ βα −−=
where is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, is the return for firm i on day t, 
is a proxy measure for the return on the market portfolio (CFMRC value weighted 
index), and 
tiAR , tiR ,
tmR ,
iαˆ and are OLS estimates of the market model parameters from equation 
(4.2).   
iβˆ
    (4.2)  titmiiti RR ,,, ˆˆˆ εβα ++=
Equation (4.2) is estimated over a 250 day estimation period.  If we define day 0 as the 
announcement date of the share repurchase program and day -1 as the trading day before 
the announcement period, then the estimation period includes days -270 to -21.   
For a security to be included in the event-study sample, some restrictions are 
placed in order to ensure that our estimates are robust.  First, a security must not be 
missing any returns in the event window.  We use a five-day event window that includes 
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days -2 to +2, relative to the announcement day.32  In the initial sample of 2,281 
repurchase announcements, 705 observations are missing returns in the event window.  
The relatively large number of firms that are missing returns in the event window is a 
result of the high number of thinly traded stocks listed on the TSX.  The second condition 
for inclusion in the event-study sample is for the repurchasing firm to have at least 100 
trading days of returns in the estimation period (days -270 to -21).  An additional 69 
observations violate this condition and are excluded from the sample.  The final sample 
of share repurchase announcements included in the event-study includes 1,507 
observations.33 
To measure abnormal return around the announcement date, the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) is calculated over the event window as follows: 
          (4.3) ∑+
−=
=+−
2
2
,)2,2(
t
tii ARCAR
To test the null hypothesis that the CAR is equal to zero, we compute the test 
statistic proposed by Brown and Warner (1985): 
                                                 
 
32 We use a multi-day event window in order to account for possible information leakages 
that may occur before the announcement day. 
33 For a robustness check, we apply different estimation and event windows and different 
conditions regarding missing data in the estimation window.  We also calculate the 
abnormal return using the market adjusted method (company return less market return) 
that does not require OLS estimation of the market model parameters.  The results using 
different event-study methodologies do not differ substantially from the results presented 
in the main body of the paper.  Refer to the Section 5.4 – Robustness Tests for a 
description and results for the different event-study methodologies.  
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where N is the number of firms in the sample and T is the number of days in the 
estimation period.  Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal price performance, the test 
statistic in (4.4) is distributed Student-t with T-2 degrees of freedom.   
4.3 Short-term Repurchase Announcement Abnormal Returns 
 For the overall event-study sample, the average CAR for the 5-day event window 
surrounding the announcement date is 1.79 percent34 and is significant at the 1 percent 
level.  Table 3-1 of Chapter 3 presents the results of past studies for the announcement 
CAR.  The average abnormal announcement return in our sample is slightly higher than 
the announcement abnormal returns found in previous studies on Canadian share 
repurchase announcements.  Ikenberry et al. (2000) find a 0.93 percent abnormal return in 
                                                 
 
34 The median CAR is 0.79 percent.  Other variations to the event study methodologies 
produce results similar to those reported.  See Section 5.4 – Robustness Tests, for a 
detailed explanation of the different tests performed to check the robustness of the results.  
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the month of the repurchase announcement.  Similarly, McNally (2002) finds a 1.30 
percent CAR for the five days surrounding the repurchase announcement.  The difference 
between our results and those of previous studies may be a result of different 
methodologies and the different time frames of the studies (our study uses more recent 
data).   
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CHAPTER 5 
ANNOUNCEMENT CREDIBILITY AND REPUTATIONAL EFFECTS 
A number of different hypotheses have been proposed in an attempt to explain the 
abnormal price performance surrounding share repurchase announcements.  However, 
none of these hypotheses directly account for credibility and reputational effects when, in 
all likelihood, the credibility of the announcement plays a crucial role in the evaluation of 
the informational content of the repurchase announcement.  As our study illustrates, the 
majority of firms fail to acquire the number of shares specified in the share repurchase 
announcement and one in five repurchasing firms fail to acquire any shares at all.  With 
share repurchases, the distribution of corporate cash flows to investors is conditional on 
the firm actually repurchasing shares.   
We examine the possibility that market participants evaluate the credibility of a 
firm’s share repurchase announcement based on the actual completion rate of the firm’s 
previous share repurchase program.  The main hypothesis of this thesis is that we expect 
credible firms to experience higher abnormal returns upon the announcement of a share 
repurchase program compared to firms that lack credibility.   
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The economics literature on game theory offers some insight into the role that 
reputation and credibility play in the presence of asymmetric information.  Shapiro 
(1983) models reputation in a buyer/seller scenario and Sobel (1985) in a 
signaling/communicating framework.  Both authors find that once established, a credible 
reputation is valuable.  Sobel (1985) elaborates in the following passage:   
This paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is 
uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with.  In this 
context, reputations for reliability are valuable.  … If an agent is 
uncertain about the motives of someone upon whom he must depend, 
either to provide information or make decisions, then the extent to 
which he trusts the other will be based on the partner’s earlier actions.35 
 
In a buyer/seller experimental context, DeJong et al. (1985) find evidence that in a 
multiperiod setting, sellers establish a reputation with buyers based on prior dealings.  In 
turn, buyers use this reputation to estimate the quality of the seller’s product and set 
prices accordingly.  
However, the literature in financial economics is somewhat silent in terms of the 
role of reputation and credibility for corporate finance events.  Only a handful of studies 
have mentioned credibility as a possible factor related to announcement abnormal returns 
(see Oded (2005), Chan et al. (2004), and Stephens and Weisbach (1998)).  None of these 
studies have examined the empirical data to verify the role, if any, that reputation plays in 
the stock price response to a share repurchase announcement.  Our research is 
groundbreaking in empirically investigating the relationship between announcement 
credibility and abnormal returns.   
                                                 
 
35 Sobel (1985), p. 557 and p. 570. 
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Stephens and Weisbach’s (1998) research offers some insight into measuring 
credibility.  Their study measured the completion rates of share repurchase programs by 
estimating the number of shares actually acquired in the 24 months following the 
repurchase announcement.  In a regression of announcement abnormal returns, they 
include their measure of actual repurchases as an explanatory variable.   The authors 
explain their reasoning: 
If investors have information about what fraction of the announced 
target they anticipate will actually be repurchased, we would expect 
them to incorporate this information into their behavior. Thus, to the 
extent that investors can forecast the firm’s future share repurchases, 
the announcement period abnormal returns should be related to actual 
share repurchases.  …For example, some firms might announce 
repurchase plans, but have expected cash flows too low to complete the 
programs; in this case we would observe a cross-sectional relation 
between announcement abnormal returns and subsequent repurchases.36  
 
The authors find a positive relation between announcement abnormal returns and actual 
subsequent repurchases.  They also suggest that a share repurchase announcement may 
lack credibility.  They reach a number of conclusions:  
[This result] suggests that the market has some ability to forecast actual 
repurchases because inaccurate market forecasts should decrease the 
informativeness of actual share repurchases.  Finally, it suggests that 
payoffs to firms that announce repurchase programs without actually 
having plans to repurchase any shares are minimal.  Apparently the 
market can (at least partially) see through attempts at such 
manipulation.37 
 
                                                 
 
36 Stephens and Weisbach (1998), p. 325 and p. 327. 
37 See idem.  The term in curved parentheses is the authors’ original quotation. 
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Stephens and Weisbach (1998) conclude that investors evaluate a firm’s credibility to 
assess the informativeness of the announcement and investors “can (at least partially) see 
through” less credible announcements.   
 Chan et al. (2003) also include actual repurchase activity subsequent to the share 
repurchase announcement as an independent variable in the regression of announcement 
abnormal returns.  They find that the coefficient on actual buyback activity is not 
significant.  However, when the measure of actual buyback activity is interacted with a 
high book-to-market dummy variable, they find a significant positive relationship and 
conclude that “while markets do not seem to react favorably to value-firms, they do seem 
to respond more favorably to value-firms that, ex-post, actually acquire stock.” 
 The theoretical problem with including the measure of ex-post actual share 
repurchases, as expressed by Chan et al. (2003), is that “at the time of the announcement, 
this [ex-post repurchase] is unknown to investors.”  Therefore, both Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) and Chan et al. (2003) assume that investors have some degree of 
foresight.  In this study, we modify Stephens and Weisbach’s (1998) methodology by 
adjusting the variable used as a proxy measure for announcement credibility.   
5.1 Measuring Credibility  
In order to test our hypothesis that market participants use past repurchase data to 
gauge the credibility of share repurchase announcements, a proxy for credibility must be 
established.  But how does one measure a variable that, at first glance, seems to be 
qualitative in nature?  If reputation is based on an agent’s earlier actions, as suggested by 
Sobel (1985), then a proxy measure for credibility should incorporate an agent’s past 
behavior. In the case of share repurchases, a firm’s historical record of its past share 
repurchase programs offers quantitative data to measure a firm’s past behavior.  We 
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construct a number of indices to proxy for the announcement credibility of a repurchasing 
firm based on historical data. 
5.1.1 Credibility index A  
Instead of using the ex-post measure of share repurchases as in Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998), our first credibility index utilizes the completion rate of the firm’s most 
recent share repurchase program as a proxy for announcement credibility.  Equation 5.1 
presents the calculation for the credibility index:  
 
i,-1
i,-1
i announced shares
acquiredactually  shares
 A indexy credibilit =0,  (5.1) 
where credibility index A i,0  is the credibility index for firm i for the current share 
repurchase announcement (period 0), shares actually acquired i,-1 is the number of shares 
actually repurchased during firm i'’s most recent (period -1) repurchase program, and 
shares announced i,-1 is the number of shares announced to be repurchased for firm i's 
most recent (period -1) share repurchase program.  This credibility index assigns higher 
announcement credibility to firms that have higher completion rates for previous 
repurchase programs.  The value for credibility index A will take a value between 0 and 
1.38 
We believe that the lagged measure of actual share repurchases is a more 
appropriate proxy for announcement credibility compared to the ex post completion rate 
because it is based on historical information that investors have access to at the time of 
                                                 
 
38 For any firm that has a completion rate greater than 100 percent, we assign that firm a 
credibility index A value of 1.  
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the repurchase announcement, rather then relying on the assumption of investor foresight 
of possible future repurchases.  At the time of a repurchase announcement, we assume 
that investors evaluate the likelihood that a firm will actually repurchase shares based on 
the firm’s record of past repurchases.39    
5.1.2 Adjusted credibility index B  
Credibility index A is simple, intuitive, and easily observable, which makes it a 
desirable variable for a proxy measure of credibility.  However, the simplicity of the 
variable may present some drawbacks when it is used as a proxy for announcement 
credibility.  Specifically, the variable does not account for price movement that occurs 
after the share repurchase announcement.  Cook et al. (2004), Ikenberry et al. (2000), and 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that firms strategically repurchase stock in response 
to price movements.  That is, actual share repurchases are negatively related to the firm’s 
prior short-term excess stock return.40  Furthermore, Ikenberry et al. (2000) find a 
negative relationship between a firm’s share repurchase completion rate and the firm’s 
                                                 
 
39 In concurrent research, Moore (2005) proposes to use a repurchasing firm’s most 
recent completion rate as a proxy for announcement credibility.  However, the paper is 
only in the proposal stage (at the time of writing) and does not present any empirical 
results.  In addition, the author proposes to use a smaller sample period (1998-2004) and 
constructs his sample using an alternative source for identifying share repurchase 
programs (Lexis-Nexis).  This study also offers an original contribution in the 
construction of various credibility indices to measure announcement credibility (see next 
section). 
40 Cook et al. (2004) find that a firm is more likely to repurchase shares if the prior 3-day 
excess return is negative.  Ikenberry et al. (2000) find that the proportion of shares 
repurchased in a given month is negatively related to the firm’s excess stock return in the 
prior month.  Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that quarterly share repurchases are 
negatively related to the prior quarter excess return of the firm.  
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excess return during the share repurchase program. These findings suggest that firms tend 
to increase stock repurchases when prices decrease and restrain from repurchasing when 
prices rise.      
The signaling hypothesis implies that a firm will announce a share repurchase 
program when management feels that the firm’s stock is undervalued.41  If the firm’s 
stock price declines after the share repurchase announcement, then the firm’s equity will 
remain undervalued.  Therefore, management will have a strong incentive to repurchase 
shares.  However, if the stock price increases after the share repurchase announcement, 
management may feel that the firm’s stock is no longer undervalued.  As a result, 
management may no longer have an incentive to repurchase shares and may refrain from 
doing so.   
Credibility index A does not account for this conditional repurchasing behavior.  
Suppose that we have two companies, Company U and Company D, and both companies 
fail to repurchase any shares in the 12 months following the share repurchase 
announcement (i.e. 0 percent completion rates).  However, Company U’s stock price 
steadily increases over the 12-month period following the announcement and Company 
D’s stock price steadily declines over the same 12-month period.  If each firm originally 
announced a share repurchase program in response to management’s belief of 
undervaluation, then the two firms in our example face different incentives to repurchase 
shares.  Company D has a strong incentive to repurchase shares because its stock is even 
                                                 
 
41 For the remainder of the paper, we refer to undervaluation and overvaluation as 
management’s belief that a firm is undervalued or overvalued based on management’s 
private information. 
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more undervalued (as perceived by management) throughout the repurchasing period 
than it was at the time of the share repurchase announcement.  In contrast, Company U 
may not have an incentive to repurchase any shares because its stock may no longer be 
undervalued (as perceived by management) during the repurchasing period.  However, if 
we use credibility index A as a proxy for the announcement credibility of future share 
repurchase programs, both firms will be assigned the same credibility index value of zero.  
In reality, Company U may have repurchased shares if an optimal opportunity arose (i.e. 
lower stock price during repurchasing period).  On the other hand, Company D had ample 
opportunity to repurchase shares (i.e. decreasing stock price over repurchasing period).  
Therefore, it may be inappropriate to assign both firms the same credibility index value. 
To overcome this problem, we construct a second credibility index, credibility 
index B.  If we assume that signaling undervaluation is the main motivation for a share 
repurchase announcement, then a firm will announce a share repurchase program when 
its management believes, based on their private information, that the company’s stock 
price is undervalued in the market.  Equation 5.2 states the condition when a company’s 
stock is undervalued:    
 
[ ]
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−
p   (5.2) 
where t is the number of days after the repurchase announcement, P0 is the market price 
of the company’s stock on the day of the announcement, [ ]ptt I PE0  is management’s 
expected future value (based on their private information, p) of the firm’s stock t days 
from the time of the repurchase announcement, C is the transaction costs associated with 
repurchasing shares (assumed to be zero), and R is the firm’s expected rate of return over 
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the period from day 0 to day t.  Under this assumption, a firm will have an incentive to 
repurchase stock on day t of the repurchasing period if: 
      (5.3) )R(1 PPt +0p
Equation 5.3 states that a firm is undervalued (according to management) if the stock 
price t days after the announcement of a share repurchase program is less than the stock 
price on the announcement date adjusted for the expected rate of return.  We will refer to 
the right side of equation 5.3 as the adjusted stock price.  Furthermore, we assume that 
the market model is an approximation of the firm’s expected rate of return:  
  (5.4) tM,t R R βα ˆˆ +=
where RRt is the firm’s expected rate of return on day t, RM,tR  is the market return on day t, 
and αˆ  and are parameter estimates from the OLS regression of equation 4.2.  
Therefore, equation 5.3 becomes: 
 βˆ
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From management’s perspective, a firm is undervalued t days after the share repurchase 
announcement if equation 5.5 is satisfied.  Therefore, a firm will have an incentive to 
repurchase shares on day t if equation 5.5 is satisfied.  Again, we refer to the term in the 
right side of equation 5.5 as the adjusted stock price.  This adjusted stock price can be 
viewed as the stock price that management believes is the minimal fair market value of 
the firm.  If the market price on day t is lower than the adjusted stock price, then the firm 
is undervalued.  If the market price on day t is higher than the adjusted stock price, then 
management believes that the firm may not be undervalued.  If equation 5.5 is satisfied 
on day t (i.e. firm is undervalued), then we classify day t as an optimal trading day.   
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For example, assume that the market rate of return over the repurchasing period 
is zero and that management’s private information set remains constant.  The rationale is 
that if management believes the stock of its firm is undervalued at the price level, P0 (the 
market price at the time of the announcement), then the stock should remain undervalued 
from the perspective of management if the market price of the stock on day t of the 
repurchasing period is less than P0.  Thus, in this case, day t would be considered an 
optimal trading day.  Equation 5.5 adjusts P0 by the firm’s expected rate of return, as 
calculated by the market model.  The rationale for adjusting the firm’s stock price by the 
expected rate of return is to account for general market movements.  For example, if the 
market return is positive over the repurchasing period and a repurchasing firm’s stock 
does not increase substantially, then management may feel that its stock is undervalued as 
a result of the stock’s underperformance relative to the market-adjusted expected return.       
Next, we create a binary variable, Ut, which takes the value of 1 if day t of the 
repurchasing period is an optimal trading day (i.e. firm is undervalued) and a value of 0 if 
day t is not an optimal trading day:   
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42 According to TSX regulations, a firm can commence repurchasing shares two days 
after receiving approval from the TSX.  Therefore, the share repurchasing period begins 3 
days after the share repurchase announcement.  We substitute P0 with P-3 in equation 5.6, 
since this is the stock price that occurs on the first day prior to the 5-day event period 
(days -2 to +2).  Our results are virtually identical when the stock price on the day of the 
announcement (P0) is used in replacement of the stock price that occurs prior to the event 
window (P-3). 
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Next, we calculate the total number of optimal trading days in the repurchasing period 
divided by the total number of repurchasing days in the 12-month repurchasing period:  
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D  (5.7) 
where Di,0 measures the opportunity that firm i has to repurchase shares during the 
repurchasing period for the current (period 0) share repurchase announcement.43  Di,0 will 
take a value between 0 and 1. 
The value for Di,0 can be viewed as the market’s expectation of the completion 
rate for the repurchasing firm.  For example, if D is equal to 1 (i.e. the firm is 
undervalued on every day of the repurchasing period) then the repurchasing firm had 
ample opportunity to complete its share repurchase program and the market would expect 
a credible firm to complete its share repurchase program under such conditions.  On the 
other hand, if D is equal to 0 (i.e. the firm is not undervalued on any day of the 
repurchasing period) then the repurchasing firm did not have optimal conditions for 
repurchasing shares and the market would not expect the firm to complete its share 
repurchase program.  We can now construct our second credibility index as follows: 
                                                 
 
43 For thinly traded stocks that may not necessarily trade on every single day of the 
repurchasing period, the number of days in the share repurchasing period may not equal 
248 days.  We adjust the number of days in the repurchasing period to account for days 
where no transactions occur.  For example, if the market did not exchange any shares for 
company X on one particular day of the repurchasing period, then the number of days in 
the repurchasing period would equal 247 days. 
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where credibility index Bi,0  is the credibility index for firm i for the current share 
repurchase announcement (period 0), shares actually acquired i,-1 is the number of shares 
actually repurchased during firm i'’s most recent (period -1) repurchase program, shares 
announced i,-1 is the number of shares announced to be repurchased for firm i's most 
recent (period -1) share repurchase program, and Di,-1 is the market’s expected 
completion rate for firm i's most recent (period -1) share repurchase program, as defined 
in equation 5.7.  Accordingly, credibility index B will take a value between -1 and +1, 
where a higher value denotes greater announcement credibility.   
Credibility index B is a variation of our first credibility index and it accounts 
for the market’s expected completion rate when measuring a repurchasing firm’s 
announcement credibility.  Credibility index B is simply calculated as the firm’s 
completion rate for its most recent share repurchase program minus the market’s 
expected completion rate for the firm’s most recent share repurchase program.  In other 
words, a firm achieves announcement credibility by actually repurchasing shares and a 
firm loses announcement credibility when it fails to repurchase shares when conditions 
are optimal for repurchasing.   
However, in order to assume that D represents the market’s expected 
completion rate for the repurchasing firm, we must make some assumptions regarding the 
market’s assessment of the share repurchase activity of a firm.  First, it is assumed that 
the market expects firms to repurchase shares at a constant rate.  That is, for each optimal 
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trading day, the market expects the repurchasing firm to repurchase a 1/248 proportion of 
the number of shares targeted for repurchase.  Second, we assume that the market is 
indifferent to whether a firm repurchases shares on an optimal trading day or whether a 
firm repurchases shares on a non-optimal trading day.  In the eyes of the market, any 
share repurchase increases a firm’s credibility, regardless of the undervaluation status of 
the firm’s stock price.   
 We now return to our example of Company D (stock price consistently decreasing 
during repurchasing period, or D is equal to 1) and Company U (stock price consistently 
increasing during repurchasing period, or D is equal to 0).  Recall that both companies 
have 0 percent completion rates for their most recent share repurchase programs.  We 
now find that Company D has a value for credibility index B of -1 and Company U has a 
value for credibility index B of 0.  However, for credibility index A, both companies 
would have an index value of 0.  Even though both companies have a previous 
completion rate of 0 percent, credibility index B assigns a lower credibility index value to 
Company D compared to Company U.  The market expected Company D to repurchase 
shares (due to Company D’s stock price consistently decreasing over the repurchasing 
period), but the market did not expect Company U to repurchase any shares (due to 
Company U’s stock price consistently increasing over the repurchasing period).  
Therefore, Company D’s announcement credibility is lower relative to Company U’s 
announcement credibility.   
Next, we assume that the most recent completion rates for the two companies in 
the above example are 100 percent.  We now find that Company D has a value for 
credibility index B of 0 and Company U has a value for credibility index B of +1.  
However, for credibility index A, both companies would have an index value of 1.  
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Credibility index B assigns a lower credibility index value to Company D compared to 
Company U.  Even though both companies have a previous completion rate of 100 
percent, the market did not expect Company U to complete its share repurchase program 
(due to Company U’s stock price consistently increasing over the repurchasing period).  
Therefore, the market was “surprised” by the share repurchases conducted by Company 
U.  On the other hand, the market expected Company D to complete its share repurchase 
program. As a result, Company U’s announcement credibility is higher relative to 
Company D’s announcement credibility.   
If we divide our sample of share repurchase announcements into quartiles based 
on the values for credibility index A and credibility index B, we can examine the average 
abnormal return observed for each quartile.  Table 5-1A and Table 5-1B include the 
average CARs for each quartile.  The tables also include another category, first time 
announcements.  Firms that announce their first repurchase program do not have a 
completion rate for a previous share repurchase program (because a previous share 
repurchase program does not exist for first time announcers).  Thus, first time 
announcements will not have a value for credibility index A or B.  Therefore, we include 
this group separately from the statistics for the quartiles.  Table 5-1A displays a general 
upward trend in the average CAR from lower to higher quartiles for credibility index A.  
Although all average quartile CARs are significant at the 10 percent level, the lower 
quartiles (i.e. firms that have lower values for credibility index A) seem to have lower 
average CARs compared to higher quartiles (i.e. firms that have higher values for 
credibility index A).  The first quartile has an average CAR of 0.99 percent, compared to 
the top quartile’s average CAR of 2.33 percent.  These results provide evidence in 
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support of our main hypothesis that credible announcers achieve higher abnormal returns 
compared to less credible firms.   
Table 5-2B reports similar statistics as the previous table, except the sample is 
divided into quartiles according to values for credibility index B.  The results are similar 
to those of Table 5-1A.  However, on average, the repurchase observations included in 
the first quartile of credibility index B (i.e. firms with the lowest announcement 
credibility) do not experience any significant abnormal returns on the announcement of a 
share repurchase program.  This suggests that the market does not react to the share 
repurchase announcements of those firms that lack announcement credibility.  The other 
quartiles have average CARs that are significantly greater than zero, suggesting that the 
market reacts favorably to share repurchase announcements of firms that have established 
some degree of announcement credibility.  
The average CAR for first time announcements is 3.03 percent and is significant 
at the one percent level.  The average CAR for first-time announcers is higher than any 
one of the quartile’s average CARs.  This suggests that first time repurchasers experience 
higher abnormal returns compared to repeat announcers.  Our results are similar to 
Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), who report that infrequent repurchase announcements 
(firms that only announced one share repurchase program within the previous five years) 
experience a stronger positive reaction from the market compared to repeat repurchases.  
The authors suggest that infrequent repurchasers are more likely to be motivated by 
undervaluation compared to firms that regularly repurchase shares.   
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Table 5-1A.  Abnormal returns for each quartile of credibility index A 
 
Quartile Mean Min Max CAR t-stat. p-value N
1 0.0049 0.0000 0.0326 0.99% 2.6535 (0.0084) 278
2 0.1123 0.0326 0.2109 0.75% 1.7336 (0.0841) 278
3 0.3731 0.2118 0.5799 1.35% 3.0501 (0.0025) 279
4 0.8637 0.5806 1.0000 2.33% 5.5827 (0.0000) 278
First time 
announcements N/A N/A N/A 3.03% 6.2267
(0.0000) 394
Credibility Index A
 
 
The sample is divided into quartiles according to values for credibility index A.  Table 5-1A presents the 
mean CAR (over 5-day event window) for each quartile and the mean, minimum, and maximum values for 
credibility index A for each quartile.  A firm that announces a repurchase program for the first time will not 
have a previous completion rate, and thus will not have a value for credibility index A.  Therefore, we 
group all first time announcements into one group. 
 
 
Table 5-1B.  Abnormal returns for each quartile of credibility index B 
 
Quartile Mean Min Max CAR t-stat. p-value N
1 -0.7928 -1.0000 -0.5559 0.44% 1.0344 (0.3019) 278
2 -0.3194 -0.5536 -0.0747 1.74% 4.2477 (0.0000) 278
3 0.0338 -0.0726 0.1697 1.51% 3.6658 (0.0003) 279
4 0.5326 0.1737 1.0000 1.73% 3.9831 (0.0001) 278
First time 
announcements N/A N/A N/A 3.03% 6.2267
(0.0000) 394
Credibility Index B
 
 
The sample is divided into quartiles according to values for credibility index B.  Table 5-1B presents the 
mean CAR (over 5-day event window) for each quartile and the mean, minimum, and maximum values for 
credibility index B for each quartile.  A firm that announces a repurchase program for the first time will not 
have a previous completion rate, and thus will not have a value for credibility index B.  Therefore, we 
group all first time announcements into one group. 
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5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
To further explore the relationship that credibility may play in the cross-sectional 
variation of abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of a repurchase program, we 
perform a multivariate analysis.  We utilize a number of regression equations that take the 
form: 
 ijij
j
ii CONTROLYCREDIBILITCAR εβββ +++= ∑ ,210     (5.9) 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for share repurchase program i, 
CREDIBILITY is one of the credibility indices described in section 5.1 and CONTROL is 
a set of control variables that previous research has shown to affect the cross-sectional 
variation in repurchase announcement returns.   
If our main hypothesis is valid, then we would expect to find a significantly 
positive estimate for 1β  in equation 5.9.  That is, firms that have a reputation for 
completing their share repurchase programs should experience higher abnormal returns 
compared to firms that have a reputation for not following through with their share 
repurchase announcements.  We also add another variable, subsequent completion rate as 
examined in Stephens and Weisbach (1998).  This variable is the ex-post number of 
shares repurchased in the 12 months following the repurchase announcement.     
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We use a number of control variables that are predominate in the share repurchase 
literature.44  The variable, % of shares announced, measures the number of shares stated 
to be repurchased as a percentage of total shares outstanding in the month previous to the 
announcement of the share repurchase program.  The variable, pre-event CAR, is the 
cumulative abnormal return over the one-year period prior to the announcement date,45 
size is the rank (where 1 is lowest) of the market capitalization of the announcing firm,46 
beta is the estimation of the firm’s beta from the market model (equation 4.2), cash is the 
value of the firm’s cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets in the year previous to 
the announcement, and book-to-market is the ratio of book-to-market equity in the year 
previous to the announcement47.   
Table 5-2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample used in the multivariate 
regression.  The mean value for % of shares announced is 5.79 percent (5.00 percent 
median), this is consistent with the maximum allowable amount of shares that can be 
repurchased according to the guidelines of the TSX.  The mean value for the long-term 
                                                 
 
44 Discussion of the rationale for inclusion and the expected parameter estimates for 
control variables is included in the next section, 5.3.1 Multivariate results for credibility 
index A.  
45 The variable, pre-event CAR, measures the cumulative abnormal return over days -3 to 
-252 (relative to the announcement), where the abnormal return is calculated by 
subtracting the CFMRC value weighted market return from the company’s return.  
46 Size rank is calculated as the rank, relative to the rest of the sample of share 
repurchases, of the firm’s size, calculated as the closing share price at the end of the 
month prior to the announcement multiplied by shares outstanding. 
47 Values for cash and equivalents, total assets, and book value per share are from 
Compustat.  Market security prices are from CFMRC. 
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pre-event CAR and the short-term pre-event CAR is 6.26 and -1.63 percent, 
respectively.48  This suggests that firms that announce share repurchase programs, on 
average, do not experience long-term negative price performance prior to the repurchase 
announcement.  However, it seems that the repurchase announcement is preceded by a 
short-term price decline.  The average beta is less than one, suggesting that the average 
repurchasing firm is less risky than the overall market.  The mean value for cash is 11.73 
percent (5.75 percent median), suggesting that announcing firms, on average, hold 
roughly one-tenth of the book value of their assets in cash and cash equivalents.   
 
                                                 
 
48 The variable, pre-event CAR (long-term), measures the excess CAR over the one-year 
period prior to the repurchase announcement.  The variable, pre-event CAR (short-term), 
measures the excess CAR over the 40-day period prior to the repurchase announcement.  
The time horizons used to measure the CAR prior to the repurchase announcement are 
consistent with the time horizons of previous studies.   
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Table 5-2.  Descriptive statistics for sample used in multivariate regression 
 
Variable Standard
Deviation
% of shares announced 0.0579 ** 0.0500 0.0324
pre-event CAR (long-term) 0.0626 ** 0.0529 0.4331
pre-event CAR (short-term) -0.0163 ** -0.0121 0.1807
beta 0.5314 ** 0.4369 0.4806
book-to-market 0.7923 ** 0.4719 1.2721
cash 0.1173 ** 0.0575 0.1552
credibility index A 0.3388 ** 0.2119 0.3436
credibility index B -0.1365 ** -0.0736 0.5119
Mean Median
 
 
Table 5-2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used in the regression of equation 5.9.  The variable, 
% of share announced, measures the percent of total shares outstanding that the repurchaser announces it is 
repurchasing, pre-event CAR (long-term) is the prior one-year cumulative abnormal return (calculated as 
the firm return minus the return on the CFMRC value weighted index) over the window (-3 to -252), pre-
event CAR (short-term) is the cumulative abnormal return prior to the repurchase announcement (calculated 
as the firm return minus the return on the CFMRC value weighted index) over the 40-day window prior to 
the event (-3 to -42), beta is the measure of systematic risk measured by the market model coefficient 
estimated over the estimation window (-270 to -21), book-to-market is the firm’s ratio of book to market 
equity in the sample, and cash is the amount of cash and equivalents scaled by total assets.  ** denotes that 
the mean is statistically different from zero at the one percent level, except for beta where ** denotes that 
the mean value for beta is statistically different from one.  
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 5.3 Results 
In this section we present the results from the multivariate regression analysis.  
We investigate two different indices as proxy measures for announcement credibility.  
Accordingly, this section presents the results for credibility index A in sub-section 5.3.1 
and the results for credibility index B in sub-section 5.3.2.    
5.3.1  Multivariate results for credibility index A 
Table 5-3 provides the results from the regression of equation 5.9 using our first 
credibility index, credibility index A.49  Table 5-3 presents three different models that 
analyze different combinations of explanatory variables.  Previous studies (see Comment 
and Jarrell, 1991; Kahle, 2002; Michaely and Grullon, 2004) have found a negative 
relationship between the abnormal return in the pre-announcement period and the 
abnormal return on the announcement of the repurchase program.  That is, the market 
reacts more favorably to share repurchase announcements for firms that experience poor 
price performance prior to the announcement.  The results in Table 5-3 are consistent 
with these findings as the coefficient on pre-event CAR is negative and statistically 
significant.  In the share repurchase literature, this negative relationship is seen as 
evidence for the signaling/undervaluation hypothesis.  Firms tend to announce 
repurchases when their stock price has declined and the market reacts more favorably to 
                                                 
 
49 See Appendix A, Table A-1 for the correlation matrix for the variables used in Models 
1 and 2 and Table A-2 for a correlation matrix for the variables used in Model 3.  The 
announcement credibility variable, Credibility Index A, is not substantially correlated 
with any of the main control variables.  This suggests that multicollinearity is not a major 
concern when interpreting our parameter estimates for announcement credibility. 
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firms that experience poor price performance prior to the repurchase announcement.  Our 
results are consistent with these findings. 
The coefficient on the variable that measures the percentage of shares targeted for 
repurchase (% of shares announced) is not significant in any of the three models.  
However, prior studies on U.S. repurchasing firms find a significant positive relationship 
between the target percent of shares announced and announcement abnormal returns (see 
Chan et al., 2004; Grullon and Michaely, 2002).  Canadian regulations place a restriction 
on the maximum percent of shares outstanding that can be repurchased in a twelve month 
period.50  However, in the U.S. firms do not face any restrictions on the size of a share 
repurchase program.  Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Chan et al. (2004) find that the 
mean share repurchase program size for U.S. firms is for 6.77 and 6.90 percent of shares 
outstanding, respectively (compared to the 5.79 percent mean size for Canadian 
repurchase programs).  Furthermore, the average share repurchase program size for U.S. 
firms varies from year to year.  This may explain why the size of the repurchase program 
has a significant effect on the announcement abnormal return for U.S. firms, but no 
apparent relationship for Canadian firms.         
                                                 
 
50 The maximum allowable amount of shares that can be repurchased is the greater of 5 
percent of shares outstanding or 10 percent of the public float.  
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Table 5-3.  Multivariate regression results for credibility index A  
 
Model 1 2 3
Intercept 0.0271 ** 0.0165 ** 0.0176 *
(0.0000) (0.0312) (0.0388)
CONTROL Variables:
% of shares announced 0.0062 0.0157 0.0241
(0.9220) (0.8299) (0.7401)
pre-event CAR -0.0149 ** -0.0052 -0.0136 **
(0.0016) (0.3778) (0.0148)
size -3.01E-05 ** -2.19E-05 ** -2.65E-05 **
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000)
beta 0.0112 ** 0.0087 0.0090 *
(0.0126) (0.1148) (0.0868)
book-to-market 0.0027
(0.1690)
cash 0.0447 **
(0.0044)
CREDIBILITY Variables:
credibility index A 0.0149 ** 0.0176 ** 0.0131 **
(0.0117) (0.0275) (0.0476)
credibility index A (-2) -0.0066
(0.4441)
credibility index A (-3) 0.0019
(0.7944)
n 1112 554 769
adjusted R² 0.0423 0.0210 0.0597
F-test 10.8227 ** 2.6955 ** 7.9656 **
 
 
Table 5-3 reports cross-sectional regression results of the initial market reaction to the share repurchase 
announcement.  The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market 
model for the 5-day event window (-2,+2) surrounding the announcement date.  The explanatory variables 
are as follows:  % of share announced is the percent of total shares outstanding that the repurchaser 
announces it is repurchasing, pre-event CAR is the cumulative abnormal return (calculated as the firm 
return minus the return on the CFMRC value weighted index) over the one-year period prior to the event 
window (-3 to -252), size is the rank of the firm’s market capitalization in the sample, beta is the measure 
of systematic risk measured by the market model coefficient estimated over the estimation window (-270 to 
-21), book-to-market is the firm’s ratio of book to market equity, cash is the amount of cash and short term 
investments scaled by total assets, credibility index A is the firm’s most recent share repurchase completion 
rate (calculated as the number of shares actually acquired divided by the target number of shares), 
credibility index A (-2) is the completion rate for the firm’s second most recent share repurchase program, 
and credibility index A (-3) is the completion rate for the firm’s third most recent share repurchase program.  
The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent 
levels, respectively.  A p-value of (0.0000) denotes that the p-value is less than 0.001.  We also include the 
test statistic for the F-test that tests the null hypothesis that all parameter estimates are simultaneously equal 
to zero.  
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Previous studies have found a negative relationship between firm size and 
announcement abnormal returns (see Chan et al., 2004; Kahle, 2002; Michaely and 
Grullon, 2004).  Researchers’ rationale for this relationship is that firm size acts as a 
proxy for informational asymmetries between the market and firm insiders.  Larger firms 
tend to be closely scrutinized by the media, institutional investors, and financial analysts, 
leading to less information asymmetries.  Therefore, a share repurchase announcement 
may be more informative to investors of small firms than for investors of larger firms.  
Consistent with previous research, Table 5-3 reports that the parameter estimate for size 
rank is negative (larger firms experience less abnormal return, ceteris paribus) and 
statistically significant.  We also include a measure of systematic risk in our regressions 
in Table 5-3 (see McNally, 1999).  The coefficient is significantly positive, suggesting 
that firms whose stock returns are more sensitive to the market return experience greater 
abnormal announcement returns.   
The last set of control variables that we include in the multi-variant analysis are 
variables to control for cash and book-to-market values, which are included in Model 3 of 
Table 5-3.  Some studies have found a positive, albeit weak (i.e. low significance level) 
relationship between book-to-market values and announcement abnormal returns (see 
Michaely and Grullon, 2004; Li and McNally, 2007).  Researchers interpret this result as 
evidence for the signaling hypothesis, since low book-to-market firms may be more 
susceptible to undervaluation.  The sign for the coefficient of book-to-market equity for 
our regression is positive, as expected.  However, we find that the parameter estimate for 
book-to-market is not significant (p-value of 16.9 percent).  Previous studies have also 
found a positive relationship between announcement abnormal returns and the amount of 
cash on the firm’s balance sheet (see Chan et al., 2004; Kahle, 2002; Michaely and 
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Grullon, 2004).  This positive relationship is interpreted as evidence for the free cash-
flow hypothesis.  Our results also indicate a significant, positive relationship between 
cash and announcement abnormal returns, thus providing evidence in support of the free 
cash-flow hypothesis. .      
Our main test variable in Table 5-3 is the proxy for announcement credibility, 
credibility index A, which measures the completion rate of the firm’s most recent share 
repurchase program.  The coefficient on credibility index A  is significantly positive and 
is robust across all three models in Table 5-3.51  The coefficient estimate in Model 1 is 
0.0149 (p-value of 0.0117).52  In Model 3 of Table 5-3, we add two additional control 
variables, book-to-market and cash.  The parameter estimate for credibility index A in 
Model 3 remains positive and significant after adding the two additional explanatory 
variables.53  Therefore, our results are robust to the inclusion of these additional 
explanatory variables.  
In general, our results from the regressions in Table 5-3 indicate that 
announcement abnormal returns are higher for firms that have completed a greater 
                                                 
 
51 For robustness check, we perform the identical regression analysis for abnormal returns 
calculated using a variety of event study methodologies.  The results are robust to those 
presented in the main body of the paper.  Please refer to Section 5.4 – Robustness Tests 
for a detailed explanation of alternative tests for robustness. 
52 The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the parameter estimate is equal to 
zero. 
53 Our sample size is smaller in Model 1 compared to Model 3 due to the limited 
coverage of Canadian firms in Compustat.  Compustat does not include the required data 
needed to construct the variables book-to-market and cash for 343 share repurchase 
observations in our sample.  
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proportion of their previous share repurchase programs.  The results provide evidence in 
support for our main hypothesis.  That is, our results suggest that credible firms 
experience higher abnormal returns upon the announcement of a share repurchase 
program compared to firms that lack credibility. 
The adjusted R-square values for the regressions vary depending on the regression 
model and range from a low of 2 percent to a high of nearly 6 percent.  Although the 
adjusted R-square values for the regressions are relatively low, they are consistent with 
R-square values from prior research (see Michaely and Grullon, 2004; Kahle, 2002; 
Stephens and Weisbach, 1998).  Furthermore, the test statistic is significant in all 
regression models for the F-test of the null hypothesis that all parameter estimates are 
simultaneously equal to zero.     
In order to examine the possibility that investors evaluate the credibility of a 
firm’s repurchase announcement based on an extended history of the firm’s repurchase 
programs, we add two additional variables:  credibility index A (-2) and credibility index 
A (-3).54  These variables represent the completion rates of the second and third most 
recent share repurchase programs, respectively.  The results are presented in Model 2 of 
Table 5-3.  The coefficients on credibility index A (-2) and credibility index A (-3) are 
both insignificant.  However, the coefficient on our main announcement credibility 
variable, credibility index A, remains significantly positive.  This suggests that investors 
                                                 
 
54 The (-2) term in the variable, credibility index A (-2), denotes the second most recent 
share repurchase program and the (-3) term in the variable, credibility index A (-3), 
denotes the third most recent share repurchase program.   
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place more importance on the most recent share repurchase program when evaluating 
announcement credibility. 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find a positive relationship between abnormal 
return and ex-post completion rates.55  Their explanation for this result is that the market 
may have some ability in forecasting the actual amount of ex post repurchases and can 
identify, to some degree, firms that do not intend to fulfill their announced share 
repurchase programs.  In Table 5-4, we include the ex-post completion rate, denoted as 
subsequent completion rate (+1), in the regression equations.  In Models 1 and 2, the 
coefficient for the ex post completion rate is significantly positive.  These results are 
similar to the results of Stephens and Weisbach (1998).  However, when we add our 
proxy measure of credibility, credibility index A, in Models 3 and 4, we find that the 
parameter estimates for subsequent completion rate (+1) are not significantly different 
from zero.  Furthermore, the parameter estimate for credibility index A remains 
significantly positive in Model 3 and is marginally insignificant in Model 4 (p-value of 
0.1103).  This provides evidence that the most recent completion rate, credibility index A 
(which is actually known at the time of the repurchase announcement), is more relevant 
to the market than the ex-post measure of actual repurchases (which is unknown at the 
time of the announcement) when evaluating announcement credibility.   
                                                 
 
55 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) calculate completion rates using the actual share 
repurchases over the two and three year periods following the share repurchase 
announcement.  Their regression results are similar for completion rates calculated using 
the actual share repurchases over the one year following the repurchase announcement.   
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Table 5-4.  Multivariate regression results for credibility index A (with inclusion of 
subsequent completion rate (+1) variable) 
 
Model 1 2 3 4
Intercept 0.0302 ** 0.0205 ** 0.0268 ** 0.0181 **
(0.0000) (0.0218) (0.0000) (0.0453)
CONTROL Variables:
% of shares announced 0.0199 0.0344 0.0117 0.0277
(0.7624) (0.6518) (0.8595) (0.7164)
pre-event CAR -0.0122 ** -0.0101 * -0.0121 * -0.0096
(0.0173) (0.0994) (0.0178) (0.1196)
size -3.07E-05 ** -2.76E-05 ** -3.05E-05 ** -2.77E-05 **
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
beta 0.0082 * 0.0052 0.0091 * 0.0061
(0.0970) (0.3708) (0.0647) (0.2971)
book-to-market 2.52E-03 2.25E-03
(0.2175) (0.2701)
cash 0.0455 ** 0.0436 **
(0.0093) (0.0128)
CREDIBILITY Variables:
credibility index A 0.0154 ** 0.0128
(0.0296) (0.1103)
subsequent completion rate (+1) 0.0114 * 0.0146 * 0.0045 0.0088
(0.0884) (0.0530) (0.5384) (0.2939)
n 1000 677 1000 677
adjusted R² 0.0358 0.0528 0.0394 0.0550
F-test 8.4136 ** 6.3837 ** 7.8286 ** 5.5774 **
 
 
Table 5-4 reports cross-sectional regression results of the initial market reaction to the share repurchase 
announcement and includes the ex post completion rate as an independent variable.  The dependent variable 
is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market model for the 5-day event window (-2,+2) 
surrounding the announcement date.  The explanatory variables are as follows:  % of share announced is 
the percent of total shares outstanding that the repurchaser announces it is repurchasing, pre-event CAR is 
the cumulative abnormal return (calculated as the firm return minus the return on the CFMRC value 
weighted index) over the one-year period prior to the event window (-3 to -252), size is the rank of the 
firm’s market capitalization in the sample, beta is the measure of systematic risk measured by the market 
model coefficient estimated over the estimation window (-270 to -21), book-to-market is the firm’s ratio of 
book to market equity, cash is the amount of cash and short term investments scaled by total assets, 
credibility index A is the firm’s most recent share repurchase completion rate (calculated as the number of 
shares actually acquired divided by the target number of shares), and subsequent completion rate (+1) is 
the completion rate of the current repurchase program over the 12-month period following the 
announcement.  The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent and 
5 percent levels, respectively.  A p-value of (0.0000) denotes that the p-value is less than 0.001.  Note that 
the number of observations is different from the regressions in Table 5-3 because share repurchase 
announcements that occur in 2005 do not have values for the ex post completion rate because, at the time of 
writing, share repurchase programs initiated in 2005 have not yet been completed.  We also include the test 
statistic for the F-test that tests the null hypothesis that all parameter estimates are simultaneously equal to 
zero. 
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5.3.2  Multivariate results for credibility index B 
Recall that credibility index B is calculated as the firm’s completion rate for its 
most recent share repurchase program minus the market’s expected completion rate for 
the firm’s most recent share repurchase program.  The index is calculated according to 
equation 5.8.  Credibility index B accounts for the interdependence between the level of 
share prices during the repurchasing period and share repurchase activity.  However, 
credibility index A assigns the same index value to firms that have identical repurchase 
completion rates, regardless of the circumstances the firm faces in the repurchasing 
period.  In this section, we examine the results for our second credibility index.   
Table 5-5 presents the results of the regressions that include credibility index B as 
an explanatory variable.56  The parameter estimates for the control variables are very 
similar to the regressions in Table 5-3 that use credibility index A as the regressor and all 
estimates for control variables are consistent with a priori expectations and the extant 
literature, as described in section 5.3.1.  In Model 1 of Table 5-5, the parameter estimate 
for credibility index B is 0.0101 (p-value of 0.0123).  In Model 2, we add the control 
variables, book-to-market and cash to the regressions.  The parameter estimate for 
credibility index B remains virtually unchanged in Model 2, with a coefficient of 0.0112 
(p-value of 0.0149).   
                                                 
 
56 See Appendix A, Table A-3 for the correlation matrix for the variables used in Model 1 
and Table A-4 for a correlation matrix for the variables used in Model 2.  The 
announcement credibility variable, Credibility Index B, is not substantially correlated 
with any of the main control variables.  This suggests that multicollinearity is not a major 
concern when interpreting our parameter estimates for announcement credibility.  
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Our results suggest that, after accounting for the price conditions a repurchasing 
firm encounters during the course of its share repurchase program, firms that have a 
higher credibility index value experience a greater abnormal return on the announcement 
of a share repurchase program.  These results provide further support for the main 
hypothesis of this thesis which states that credible firms should experience higher 
abnormal returns upon the announcement of a share repurchase program compared to 
firms that lack credibility.   
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Table 5-5.  Multivariate regression results for credibility index B  
 
Model 1 2
Intercept 0.0331 ** 0.0231 **
(0.0000) (0.0060)
CONTROL Variables:
% of shares announced 0.0069 0.0251
(0.9129) (0.7290)
pre-event CAR -0.0173 ** -0.0166 **
(0.0003) (0.0035)
size -2.92E-05 ** -2.55E-05 **
(0.0000) (0.0001)
beta 0.0108 ** 0.0086
(0.0160) (0.1020)
book-to-market 0.0027
(0.1640)
cash 0.0456 **
(0.0036)
CREDIBILITY Variables:
credibility index B 0.0101 ** 0.0112 **
(0.0123) (0.0149)
n 1112 769
adjusted R² 0.0422 0.0622
F-test 10.8015 ** 8.2812 **
 
 
Table 5-5 reports cross-sectional regression results of the initial market reaction to the share repurchase 
announcement.  The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market 
model for the 5-day event window (-2,+2) surrounding the announcement date.  The explanatory variables 
are as follows:  % of share announced is the percent of total shares outstanding that the repurchaser 
announces it is repurchasing, pre-event CAR is cumulative abnormal return (calculated as the firm return 
minus the return on the CFMRC value weighted index) over the one-year period prior to the event window 
(-3 to -252), size is the rank of the firm’s market capitalization, beta is the measure of systematic risk 
measured by the market model coefficient estimated over the estimation window (-270 to -21), book-to-
market is the firm’s ratio of book to market equity, cash is the amount of cash and short term investments 
scaled by total assets, and credibility index B is calculated as the firms most recent share repurchase 
completion rate minus the market’s expected completion rate (see equation 5.8).  The numbers in 
parentheses are p-values.  ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
A p-value of (0.0000) denotes that the p-value is less than 0.001.  We also include the test statistic for the 
F-test that tests the null hypothesis that all parameter estimates are simultaneously equal to zero. 
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5.4 Robustness Tests 
To test the robustness of our results, we calculate the abnormal return on the 
announcement of the share repurchase program using different event study 
methodologies.  Table B-1 of Appendix B provides a summary of the different 
methodologies used in the robustness tests and the sample average CAR that results from 
the application of each methodology.  The average CAR for the entire sample of share 
repurchases ranges from 1.51% to 1.92%, depending on the methodology used.  For the 
sake of brevity, we do not include the results for the multivariate analysis using the CAR 
from the alternative event-study methodologies.57  Overall, the results from the previous 
regressions in Section 5.3 are robust to alternative event-study methodologies and we 
observe a consistent positive relationship between announcement abnormal returns and 
announcement credibility measures. 
To further test the robustness of our results, we construct additional credibility 
indices as alternative proxy measures for announcement credibility.  In total, we construct 
five alternative credibility indices.  A description of the construction of each alternative 
credibility index is provided in Appendix C.  The alternative credibility indices, previous 
repurchase dummy (credibility index A2) and previous repurchase >median dummy 
(credibility index A3) are both variations of credibility index A.  The last three alternative 
credibility indices are variations of credibility index B:  credibility index B2, credibility 
index B3, and credibility index B4.  The only difference between credibility index B and 
credibility index B2 and B3, is the definition of an optimal share repurchasing trading day 
                                                 
 
57 Results are available upon request. 
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(i.e. the condition that classifies a repurchasing firm as undervalued in the repurchasing 
period).  
 The first variation of credibility index A is the index, previous repurchase dummy, 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm repurchased any shares 
in its previous repurchase program (i.e. credibility index A > 0).  The second variation of 
credibility index A is the index, previous repurchase >median dummy, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s previous share repurchase program 
completion rate was greater than the overall sample median completion rate (18.30 
percent).     
For the sake of brevity, the results for the multivariate analysis using previous 
repurchase dummy and previous repurchase >median dummy as credibility indices are 
included in Table C-1 of Appendix C.  The results are moderately supportive of our first 
hypothesis, however the parameter estimates for the credibility variables are not 
significant in all of the regressions (only Model 3 of Table C-1 is significant).  This 
suggests that a binary representation of a firm’s announcement credibility is not as strong 
of a predictor of abnormal returns as a continuous variable (e.g. credibility index A).   
Table C-2 reports the results for the regression equations that use the three 
variations of credibility index B.  The parameter estimates are significantly positive for 
all three variations of credibility index B.  Therefore, this provides further verification 
that the results in the previous sections are robust to different proxies for announcement 
credibility.  The results from the robustness tests provide further evidence in support of 
our main hypothesis that credible announcers experience higher abnormal returns on the 
announcement of a share repurchase program compared to firms that lack credibility. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
The extant literature reports a positive price reaction for firms announcing an 
open-market share repurchase program.  However, these studies overlook the fact that 
firms that announce share repurchase programs are not obligated to follow through in the 
actual acquisition of their shares.  This study reports that the majority of firms fail to 
repurchase the target amount of shares in the months following the repurchase 
announcement.  Furthermore, many firms fail to repurchase any shares at all.  Therefore, 
the announcement of a share repurchase program has a degree of uncertainty regarding 
the announcing firm’s credibility.  Firms that fail to complete repurchase programs are 
likely to be perceived as less committed to future share repurchase programs.   
Literature on share repurchases suggests credibility may be an alternative 
explanation for the abnormal return observed on the announcement of a repurchase 
program (Oded, 2004; Chen et al., 2004).  However, no previous evidence exists on the 
effect of credibility on share repurchase announcement abnormal returns.  One exception 
is Stephens and Weisbach (1998), who examine the relationship between ex-post share 
repurchase completion rates and announcement abnormal returns.   
This study expands on Stephen and Weisbach’s (1998) research and examines the 
possibility that market participants evaluate the credibility of a firm’s share repurchase 
announcement by using information of a firm’s past share repurchase history.  Our 
research is groundbreaking in investigating the measurement and the impact of 
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announcement credibility.  We also offer an original contribution in the construction of a 
credibility index that accounts for the interdependence of share repurchases and stock 
price movements subsequent to the repurchase announcement.   
We study the detailed information of the completion rates of share repurchase 
programs for firms listed on the TSX.  Our results indicate a positive relationship 
between a firm’s prior share repurchase completion rate and the abnormal return on 
subsequent share repurchase announcements.  Therefore, we conclude that this study 
finds convincing evidence that investors react more favorably to the share repurchase 
announcements of “credible” firms compared to firms that lack credibility. 
Our research is especially relevant to U.S. market regulators in determining the 
future market regulation regarding open-market share repurchase programs.  Fried (2005) 
recommends that the SEC require firms to disclose specific details of open-market share 
repurchases prior to the repurchase transaction.  For example, a firm that intends to 
repurchase shares in the near future must announce the instructions it provides to its 
broker (e.g. buy 250,000 shares at or below $25 per share over the next five trading days) 
prior to the actual repurchase transaction.  This type of regulation would increase market 
transparency and establish greater credibility of share repurchase announcements by 
ensuring that firm’s actually follow through with their announced intentions.       
6.2 Limitations 
The indices used to quantify announcement credibility are proxy measures based 
on a firm’s share repurchase history.  There may be other unidentified factors that affect 
the credibility of a firm’s announcement.  Furthermore, Canadian regulations place size 
restrictions (maximum of 5 percent of shares outstanding) and time limits (12-month 
maximum) on share repurchase programs.  Therefore, it is possible that a firm may intend 
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to implement a share repurchase that is larger than the maximum allowable restriction 
over a period longer than the twelve month allowable duration by implementing a series 
of consecutive repurchases programs.  However, this study considers every individual 
share repurchase program to be independent of previous repurchase programs.  In 
addition, if a firm announces a share repurchase program on a regular basis, the market 
may develop expectations of the share repurchase announcement and the price response 
to the announcement may be minimal.   
6.3 Future Research 
It is possible that corporate governance issues have an effect on the credibility of 
an announcing firm.  Therefore, it may be productive to investigate any plausible 
relationship between corporate governance and share repurchase announcement 
credibility.  In addition, recent corporate events and legislation has focused on increasing 
the accountability of management and the credibility of financial reporting.  Perhaps this 
shift towards improved corporate integrity has affected the share repurchase decisions of 
firms.   
Share repurchases may have an impact on the stock’s return volatility and 
skewness.  If a firm repurchases shares in an attempt to dampen sell-side pressure, then it 
is possible that the firm’s share repurchases create a temporary price floor.  Therefore, a 
share repurchase transactions may lower return volatility and lower the probability of a 
decrease in the firm’s stock price (compared to a scenario where the firm does not 
actively repurchase shares).  This, in turn, may influence volatility related securities, such 
the prices of options for the firm’s stock.   
In our analysis, we observed that firms with dual class share structures tend to 
repurchase a greater proportion of restricted voting shares compared to superior voting 
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shares.  Perhaps this observation represents a control issue.  Further investigation may 
clarify this issue. 
Lastly, we leave for further research the study of the effect of announcement 
credibility on other corporate events where, as in share repurchases, the actual 
implementation of the announcement is uncertain and conditional on management’s 
discretion.  
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APPENDIX A 
CORRELATION MATRICES FOR TABLE 5-2 
Table A-1.  Correlation matrix for Table 5-3, Models 1 and 2  
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subsequent completion rate (+1) 1.0000
credibility index A 0.4218 1.0000
(<.0001)
credibility index A (-2) 0.3191 0.4573 1.0000
(<.0001) (<.0001)
credibility index A (-3) 0.2306 0.3086 0.4274 1.0000
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
% of shares announced 0.0098 0.0490 0.1073 0.0626 1.0000
(0.7564) (0.1027) (0.0026) (0.1413)
pre-event CAR -0.0485 -0.0007 0.1571 0.0957 0.0428 1.0000
(0.1253) (0.9815) (<.0001) (0.0243) (0.1538)
size 0.0352 -0.0082 -0.0168 -0.0139 -0.0509 -0.0325 1.0000
(0.2661) (0.7847) (0.6380) (0.7439) (0.0900) (0.2785)
beta 0.0585 -0.0365 -0.0010 -0.0084 0.0434 -0.1020 0.3110 1.0000
(0.0646) (0.2243) (0.9782) (0.8431) (0.1477) (0.0007) (<.0001)  
Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
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Table A-2.  Correlation matrix for Table 5-3, Model 3* 
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credibility index A 1.0000
% of shares announced 0.0445 1.0000
(0.2178)
pre-event CAR -0.0359 0.0430 1.0000
(0.3201) (0.2341)
size -0.0146 -0.0459 -0.0245 1.0000
(0.6864) (0.2041) (0.4974)
beta -0.0195 0.0820 -0.0793 0.3256 1.0000
(0.5889) (0.0230) (0.0280) (<.0001)
book-to-market 0.1297 -0.0553 -0.1774 -0.2751 -0.0552 1.0000
(0.0003) (0.1253) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1262)
cash 0.0291 -0.0102 0.0193 -0.1932 0.1402 -0.0778 1.0000
(0.4210) (0.7773) (0.5934) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0309)  
 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the test of the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is equal to zero. 
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Table A-3.  Correlation matrix for Table 5-5, Model 1 
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credibility index B 1.0000
% of shares announced 0.0576 1.0000
(0.0548)
pre-event CAR 0.1957 0.0428 1.0000
(<.0001) (0.1538)
size -0.0770 -0.0509 -0.0325 1.0000
(0.0102) (0.0900) (0.2785)
beta -0.0436 0.0434 -0.1020 0.3110 1.0000
(0.1461) (0.1477) (0.0007) (<.0001)  
 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the test of the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is equal to zero. 
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credibility index B 1.0000
% of shares announced 0.0464 1.0000
(0.1989)
pre-event CAR 0.1917 0.0430 1.0000
(<.0001) (0.2341)
size -0.0714 -0.0459 -0.0245 1.0000
(0.0479) (0.2041) (0.4974)
beta -0.0250 0.0820 -0.0793 0.3256 1.0000
(0.4896) (0.0230) (0.0280) (<.0001)
book-to-market 0.0804 -0.0553 -0.1774 -0.2751 -0.0552 1.0000
(0.0257) (0.1253) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1262)
cash 0.0216 -0.0102 0.0193 -0.1932 0.1402 -0.0778 1.0000
(0.5504) (0.7773) (0.5934) <.0001 (<.0001) (0.0309)  
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Table A-4.  Correlation matrix for Table 5-5, Model 2 
 
 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the test of the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is equal to zero. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
REUSLTS FROM ALTERNATIVE EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGIES 
Table B-1.  Robustness tests using alternative event study methodologies 
 
Event Study Methodolgy CAR n t p -value Event Window Estimation Period
Event study methodology 1 1.79% 1507 8.56 (0.0000) -2 to +2 -270 to -21
Event study methodology 2 1.92% 1574 9.03 (0.0000) -2 to +2 N/A
Event study methodology 3 1.87% 1450 9.06 (0.0000) -2 to +2 -150 to -21
Event study methodology 4 1.51% 1573 9.33 (0.0000) -1 to +1 -270 to -21  
 
Event study methodology 1 is the main methodology used in the body of the paper.  Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market model, with the CFMRC Value Weighted Index used as a proxy for the market 
return.  CAR is calculated over the 5-day window (-2 to +2) surrounding the announcement. We use a 250-
day estimation window (-270 to -21), and exclude any observations that do not have at least 100 days of 
returns in the estimation window. Observations are excluded that are missing return data in the event 
window. 
 
Event study methodology 2 calculates abnormal returns by subtracting the CFMRC Value Weighted Index 
returns from the firms’ returns (market adjusted method).  CAR is calculated over the 5-day window (-2 to 
+2) surrounding the announcement. Observations are excluded that are missing return data in the event 
window. 
 
Event study methodology 3 calculates abnormal returns by using the market model, with the CFMRC 
Value Weighted Index used as a proxy for the market return.  CAR is calculated over the 5-day window (-2 
to +2) surrounding the announcement. We use a 150 day estimation window (-170 to -21), and exclude any 
observations that do not have at least 100 days of returns in the estimation window. Observations are 
excluded that are missing return data in the event window. 
 
Event study methodology 4 calculates abnormal returns by using the market model, with the CFMRC 
Value Weighted Index used as a proxy for the market return.  CAR is calculated over the 3-day window (-1 
to +1) surrounding the announcement. We use a 250 day estimation window (-250 to -21), and exclude any 
observations that do not have at least 100 days of returns in the estimation window. Observations are 
excluded that are missing return data in the event window. 
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APPENDIX C 
CONSTRUCTION OF ALTERNATIVE CREDIBILITY INDICES  
 
Credibility Index A2 (previous repurchase dummy)  
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Credibility Index A3 (previous repurchase >median dummy)  
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
>
<
=>
1830.0
1830.0
i,-1
i,-1
i,-1
i,-1
i,0
announced shares
acquiredactually  shares
  if  1
announced shares
acquiredactually  shares
  if  0
  dummy median  repurchase previous
 
where the median completion rate for the entire sample of share repurchase observations 
is 18.30 percent.  
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Credibility Index B2 
We define a firm as being undervalued t days after the share repurchase announcement if 
Ut is equal to 1:  
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where Pt is the firm’s stock price t days following the previous repurchase 
announcement. P-3 is the firm’s stock price prior to the previous announcement of the 
share repurchase program.  RR  firm i on day k. i,k is the return for
 
Di,0 measures the opportunity that firm i has to repurchase shares during the repurchasing 
period for the current (period 0) share repurchase announcement:  
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Therefore, credibility index B2 is then constructed in the familiar method as follows:   
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Credibility Index B3 
We define a firm as being undervalued over the repurchasing period if U is equal to 1:  
⎩⎨
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3
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PP Average  if  0
U
f
 
where Average P is the firm’s average stock price over relative days +3 to +250.   
 
Di,0 measures the opportunity that firm i has to repurchase shares during the repurchasing 
period for the current (period 0) share repurchase announcement and is either equal to 1 
or 0:  
  U  Di =0,
Therefore, credibility index B3 is then constructed in the familiar method as follows:   
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Credibility Index B4 
We define a firm as being undervalued t days after the share repurchase announcement if 
Ut is equal to 1:  
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where Pt is the firm’s stock price t days following the previous repurchase 
announcement. P-3 is the firm’s stock price prior to the previous announcement of the 
share repurchase program.  RR eighted Index. M,k is the return in the CFMRC Value W
 
Di,0 measures the opportunity that firm i has to repurchase shares during the repurchasing 
period for the current (period 0) share repurchase announcement:  
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Therefore, credibility index B4 is then constructed as follows:   
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Credibility index B4 takes a value between 0 and 1.  In addition, the theoretical 
interpretation of credibility index B4 is different from the other variations of credibility 
index B.  Let us define announcement credibility as a measure of share repurchase 
performance, conditional on the firm having the opportunity to perform (i.e. opportunity 
to repurchase arises when firm is undervalued).  Then, (1- credibility index A) can be 
viewed as measuring the lack of share repurchase performance.  We then multiply this 
measurement by the firm’s opportunity to perform (Di,0).  Think of Di,0 as a multiplier 
that magnifies the lack of performance measurement for those firms that had a greater 
opportunity to perform.  Lastly, we subtract this result from 1 to arrive at a share 
repurchase performance score which can be interpreted as a credibility index.   
 
In other words, all repurchasing firms start out with full credibility after the 
announcement of the share repurchase program.  The firm will lose credibility only if it 
fails to complete its share repurchase program.  For firms that fail to fulfill their 
repurchase programs, those firms that had the opportunity to repurchase (i.e. values of 
Di,0 that are close to 1) but failed to do so will be lose more credibility compared to firms 
that did not have the opportunity to repurchase shares (i.e. values of Di,0 that are close to 
0). 
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Table C-1.  Multivariate regression results for previous completion dummy and previous 
completion >median dummy  
 
Model 1 2 3 4
Intercept 0.0287 ** 0.0220 ** 0.0264 ** 0.0174 *
(0.0001) (0.0227) (0.0000) (0.0449)
CONTROL Variables:
% of shares announced 0.0112 0.0338 0.0091 0.0310
(0.8589) (0.6423) (0.8847) (0.6694)
pre-event CAR -0.0151 ** -0.0137 ** -0.0151 ** -0.0137 **
(0.0014) (0.0145) (0.0013) (0.0144)
size -3.00E-05 ** -2.58E-05 ** -2.98E-05 ** -2.61E-05 **
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
beta 0.0109 ** 0.0085 0.0109 ** 0.0088 *
(0.0153) (0.1048) (0.0149) (0.0946)
book-to-market 0.0032 * 0.0029
(0.0953) (0.1316)
cash 0.0462 ** 0.0455 **
(0.0033) (0.0038)
CREDIBILITY Variables:
previous completion rate dummy 0.0040 -0.0015
(0.4672) (0.8085)
previous completion rate >median dummy 0.0102 ** 0.0072
(0.0122) (0.1202)
n 1112 769 1112 769
adjusted R² 0.0373 0.0549 0.0423 0.0578
F-test 9.6018 ** 7.3741 ** 10.8053 ** 7.7342 **
 
 
Table C-1 reports cross-sectional regression results of the initial market reaction to the share repurchase 
announcement.  The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market 
model for the 5-day event window (-2,+2) surrounding the announcement date.  The explanatory variables 
are as follows:  % of share announced is the percent of total shares outstanding that the repurchaser 
announces it is repurchasing, pre-event CAR is the prior one-year cumulative abnormal return over the  one-
year window (-3 to -252), size is the rank of the firm’s market capitalization in the sample, beta is the 
measure of systematic risk measured by the market model coefficient estimated over the estimation window 
(-270 to -21), book-to-market is the firm’s ratio of book to market equity in the sample, cash is the amount 
of cash and short term investments scaled by total assets, previous repurchase dummy is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s most recent share repurchase completion rate (calculated as the 
number of shares actually acquired divided by the target number of shares) is greater than 0%, and previous 
repurchase >median dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s most recent share 
repurchase completion rate is greater than the sample median completion rate (18.3%) and 0 otherwise.  ** 
and * denote significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  We also include the test 
statistic for the F-test that tests the null hypothesis that all parameter estimates are simultaneously equal to 
zero. 
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Table C-2.  Multivariate regression results for credibility index B2, B3, and B4 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 0.0336 ** 0.0232 ** 0.0326 ** 0.0220 ** 0.0215 ** 0.0082
(0.0000) (0.0064) (0.0000) (0.0086) (0.0033) (0.3927)
CONTROL Variables:
% of shares announced 0.0071 0.0263 0.0083 0.0259 0.0112 0.0307
(0.9108) (0.7169) (0.8950) (0.7209) (0.8584) (0.6711)
pre-event CAR -0.0173 ** -0.0163 ** -0.0176 ** -0.0173 ** -0.0170 ** -0.0166 **
(0.0005) (0.0049) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0035)
size -3.14E-05 ** -2.77E-05 ** -3.07E-05 ** -2.71E-05 ** -2.93E-05 ** -2.53E-05 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
beta 0.0112 ** 0.0091 * 0.0111 ** 0.0092 * 0.0107 ** 0.0086
(0.0125) (0.0849) (0.0132) (0.0799) (0.0164) (0.1026)
book-to-market 0.0030 0.0031 0.0027
(0.1231) (0.1050) (0.1586)
cash 0.0456 ** 0.0461 ** 0.0461 **
(0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0032)
CREDIBILITY Variables:
credibility index B2 0.0074 * 0.0082 *
(0.0940) (0.0996)
credibility index B3 0.0082 ** 0.0102 **
(0.0285) (0.0146)
credibility index B4 0.0146 ** 0.0186 **
(0.0204) (0.0090)
n 1112 769 1112 769 1112 769
adjusted R² 0.0392 0.0582 0.0410 0.0622 0.0415 0.0633
F-test 10.0775 ** 7.7799 ** 10.4948 ** 8.2790 ** 10.6166 ** 8.4112 ** 
 
Table C-2 reports cross-sectional regression results of the initial market reaction to the share repurchase 
announcement.  The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market 
model for the 5-day event window (-2,+2) surrounding the announcement date.  The explanatory variables 
are as follows:  % of share announced is the percent of total shares outstanding that the repurchaser 
announces it is repurchasing, pre-event CAR is cumulative abnormal return (calculated as the firm return 
minus the return on the CFMRC value weighted index) over the one-year period prior to the event window 
(-3 to -252), size is the rank of the firm’s market capitalization, beta is the measure of systematic risk 
measured by the market model coefficient estimated over the estimation window (-270 to -21), book-to-
market is the firm’s ratio of book to market equity, cash is the amount of cash and short term investments 
scaled by total assets, and credibility index B2, B3, and B4 are calculated according to Appendix C.  The 
numbers in parentheses are p-values.  ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, 
respectively.  A p-value of (0.000) denotes that the p-value is less than 0.001.  We also include the test 
statistic for the F-test that tests the null hypothesis that all parameter estimates are simultaneously equal to 
zero. 
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APPENDIX D 
TSX E-REVIEW SHARE REPURCHASE SUMMARY  
 
An excerpt of the summary for normal course issuer bids from the June, 2005 edition of 
the TSX E-Review is provided on the next page.58   
                                                 
 
58 The one page excerpt is the property of the TSX and no part of this excerpt may be 
reproduced in any form without prior permission from the Toronto Stock Exchange.  See 
page 100 for a copy of the written correspondence from the TSX authorizing the 
inclusion of the material in Figure D-1.   
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Figure D-1.  Example of TSX share repurchase summary 
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Figure D.2.  Copy of the written correspondence from the TSX authorizing the inclusion 
of the material in Figure D-1 
 
 
Date:  Thu, 05 Oct 2006 07:08:36 -0400 
From:  Catherine.McGravey@tsxdatalinx.com  
To:  "Luke J. Schmidt" <ljs615@mail.usask.ca>  
 
 
Subject:  Re: Permission to reproduce TSX E-Review 
 
Please accept this note as permission to use page 29 of the June 2005 TSX  
Review in your dissertation. 
 
 
Catherine McGravey 
Production Manager 
Editor TSX Review 
Datalinx 
416-947-4655 
Catherine.McGravey@tsxdatalinx.com 
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